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RETHINKING REFORM OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Sidney A. Shapiro* 
Joseph P. Tomain** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The reform of regulation of electricity markets has the potential 
to cause substantial changes in the way in which consumers receive 
and use electricity. Reform-minded actors, particularly the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), have used their 
regulatory powers to restructure electricity markets to rely on 
competition in generation markets to promote lower prices and 
innovation. Other jurisdictions have been deterred by the 
significant legal, policy, and political issues associated with reform 
efforts. California's horrendous experience with electricity 
deregulationl and the calamitous electricity blackout in the 
northeastern United States2 have added to the political, if not policy, 
challenges of achieving reform. The editors of the Wake Forest Law 
Review have dedicated this issue to understanding how these recent 
experiences have affected efforts to reform the regulation of 
electricity markets. 
Reform efforts reflect a growing rejection of the "Traditional 
Model" of electric utility regulation, and we agree that this model 
has reached the end of its useful life. Such being the case, then, 
what should replace it? Going where angels fear to tread, but fools 
do not, we argue that the United States should pursue a "Smart 
Model" of electricity generation that addresses a primary limitation 
of current efforts to restructure electricity markets. While current 
efforts seek to establish a competitive generation market, these 
efforts do little or nothing to address the significant environmental 
problems that are associated with the generation of electricity and 
* University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University School 
of Law; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation. 
** Dean Emeritus and Wilbert and Helen Ziegler Professor of Law, 
University of Cincinnati College of Law. Scholar, Center for Progressive 
Regulation. The authors appreciate the research assistance of Chad King and 
Ilya Temchenko. 
1. See Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in 
a Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297, 299-306 (2002). 
2. See Antonio Regalado & Gary Fields, Blackout a Reminder of Grid's 
Vulnerability to Terror, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at A4. 
497 
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 498 2005
498 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
that will remain in restructured electricity markets. 
In our view, the Smart Model has two components that fill this 
gap.3 On the generation side, there would be increasing reliance on 
renewable energy sources and on making the electrical grid more 
efficient and more reliable. On the consumption side, the price of 
electricity to each consumer would be based on the marginal cost of 
producing it. 
Our analysis proceeds in four stages. Part II describes the 
negative impacts on the environment associated with the generation 
of electricity and the production of energy used to generate 
electricity. While progress has been made reducing these impacts, 
they are still significant and require additional attention. 
Part III describes the birth, life, and death of the "Traditional 
Model." For the last three or more decades, federal and state 
regulators have been engaged in widespread deregulation of 
significant parts of the Traditional Mode1.4 While we recognize the 
significant advantages of this effort, it does not address reducing the 
pollution and other environmental problems caused by relying on 
fossil fuels, particularly coal, to generate electricity. Our analysis of 
the disintegration of the Traditional Model reveals that we now 
have an opportunity to remake electricity markets along the lines 
suggested by the "Smart Model," but this agenda has not received 
the attention it deserves from regulators, politicians, and the public. 
Part IV describes a Smart Model of electricity generation 
composed of four elements. A Smart Model would rely on both 
distributed generation, which is composed of small-scale sources of 
electricity generation that are environmentally friendly, and solar-
and wind-generated electricity because they are renewable sources 
of energy. A Smart Model would also utilize energy portfolios or 
regulatory standards that require electricity generators and sellers 
to obtain a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable 
sources. Finally, a Smart Model would employ a "Smart Grid" or a 
3. See Elizabeth Thomas et aI., Unlocking Regulatory Barriers to 
Sustainable Energy Systems, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 51, 51 
(recognizing the two components ofthe Smart Model). 
4. Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. 
Electric Power Sector, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT 
113 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000); Richard D. Cudahy, 
Electricity Deregulation After California: Down But Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
333, 336-37 (2002); Alfred E. Kahn, The Deregulatory Tar Baby: The Precarious 
Balance Between Regulation and Deregulation, 1970-2000 and Henceforward, J. 
REG. ECON., Jan. 2002, at 35, 53 (2002); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1323, 1324 (1998); John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and 
Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L. J. 273, 274-78 (2004). 
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system of distribution that relies on new technologies that make the 
electricity grid more reliable and efficient. 
Unfortunately, however, many elements of the Smart Model of 
electricity generation are not ready for prime time because they are 
not cost-effective as compared to traditional methods of electricity 
generation and distribution. Although the government should 
sponsor and is sponsoring projects that are intended to spur the 
development of the Smart Model, we do not anticipate the 
widespread adoption of the model until there is a more substantial 
market demand for it. 
We propose in Part V that a Smart Model of electricity 
consumption is a more viable reform. The price of electricity in this 
model is based on the marginal cost of producing and delivering 
electricity. By comparison, consumers currently pay for electricity 
based on its average cost. We recommend regulators require 
utilities to install electrical meters that measure the time of day 
during which electricity is consumed because this step would permit 
the price of electricity to be based on the cost of generating and 
distributing it. Once some form of marginal cost pricing is used, 
consumers would have an incentive to conserve electricity during 
periods of high demand, such as the hottest hours of the hottest 
days in the middle of the summer in warm states. 
Although we are hardly the first to recognize the merits of this 
step,5 this recommendation has not received the attention it 
deserves, perhaps in part because of the daunting task of installing 
electrical meters that permit marginal cost pricing in millions of 
American homes and businesses. This is unfortunate in light of the 
potential of marginal cost pricing to protect the environment. 
Moreover, once electricity is priced on the actual cost of producing 
and delivering it, there should be additional market demand for 
smart methods of electricity generation and delivery. Finally, but 
hardly least of all, some basic calculations strongly suggest that the 
installation of new meters is cost-effective and may be far less costly 
than efforts to add new generation and transmission capacity to 
electrical markets if demand continues to grow at current rates. 
II. ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The generation of electricity is one of the leading causes of 
environmental problems in this country. According to 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") data, electric utilities are 
5. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Will the California Debacle Affect 
Energy Deregulation?, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 407 (2002); Severin Borenstein et 
al., An Open Letter from 11 Energy Experts: The Time Has Come for Real-Time 
Pricing, PuB. UTIL. FORT., July 1, 2003, at 28, 28-29. 
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the biggest polluters in the United States, with emissions far 
exceeding those of other industries such as chemical manufacturing 
and refining.6 
Many of the threats to the environment are from the release of 
sulfur dioxide ("S02") and nitrogen oxides ("NOx") into the 
atmosphere when electrical energy is generated. 7 Electricity 
generated using coal produces most of the total S02 emissions in the 
United States and a large percentage of the total NOx emissions.8 
These emissions create a number of environmental and health 
problems, including the following: 
• Emission of S02 and NOx gases can form fine particles, or 
soot, when they react with the atmosphere, and coal-fired 
power plants also emit soot directly from their smokestacks.9 
According to one estimate, this form of pollution may be 
associated with as many as 64,000 premature deaths from 
d · I 10 car lOpu monary causes. 
• NOx emissions react with volatile organic compounds 
(''VOCs'') and sunlight to form ground level ozone or smog. ll 
"Millions of Americans live in areas that do not meet the 
health standards for ozone.,,12 Recent scientific research with 
laboratory animals, clinical subjects, and human populations 
has identified "a cascade of adverse health effects from ozone 
at levels common in the United States," including increased 
respiratory symptoms, damage to cells of the respiratory 
6. CLEAR THE AIR: THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN AGAINST DIRTY POWER, TOXIC 
POWER: WHAT THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY TELLS Us ABOUT POWER PLANT 
POLLUTION 1 (2000) [hereinafter CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER], available at 
http://www.cleartheair.org/trilcomplete_report.pdf. 
7. EPA, Acid Rain: What Society Can Do About Acid Deposition, at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarketsJacidrainlsociety/index.html (last updated Jan. 6, 
2004). Sulfur, which is present in coal as an impurity, reacts with air when the 
coal is burned to form SO.. By comparison, the burning of any fossil fuel forms 
NOx.Id. 
S. Id. 
9. CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, No ESCAPE: CAN You REALLY EVER "GET AWAY" 
FROM THE SMOG? A MIDSUMMER LOOK AT OZONE SMOG IN 1999 (1999), available 
at http://www.catf.usJpublicationsJreports/No_Escape.pdf. 
10. DEBORAH SHElMAN SHPRENTZ, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, BREATH-
TAKING: PREMATURE MORTALITY DUE TO PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION IN 239 
AMERICAN CITIES (1996), excerpted at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/ 
btlbtinx. asp. 
11. EPA, Six Common Air Pollutants: Chief Causes for Concern, at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/chf.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2005). 
12. EPA, Six Common Air Pollutants: Health and Environmental Impacts 
of NOx, at http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/noxlhlth.html (last updated Jan. 6, 
2005) [hereinafter EPA, Impacts of NOxl. 
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tract, pulmonary inflammation, declines in lung function, 
increased susceptibility to respiratory infections, and 
increased risk of hospitalization and early death. 13 
• Acid rain is formed when S02 and NOx react with water and 
oxygen in the atmosphere.14 Acid rain results in the 
deterioration of cars, buildings, and historical monuments 
and causes lakes and streams to become acidic and 
unsuitable for many fish. 15 
Finally, but hardly least of all, one element of NOx, nitrous 
oxide, is a greenhouse gas, which accumulates in the atmosphere 
with other greenhouse gases, causing global warming. 16 According 
to the Sierra Club, the United States emits twenty-five percent of 
the world's greenhouse gasses, and power plants are responsible for 
forty percent of these emissions.17 
Besides these emissions, power plants also produce large 
amounts of toxic metals. IS For example, power plants are the largest 
human-caused source of mercury pollution.19 Mercury is dangerous 
to fetal development,20 which is why pregnant women need to avoid 
fish caught in many waters in the United States.21 The potential 
health consequences of other metals are largely unknown, but the 
EPA has concluded that some hazardous air toxins pose health risks 
that require further study, including dioxins, arsenic, and nicke1.22 
In addition, there is considerable environmental damage 
associated with the sources of fuel used in generating electricity. 
For example, the production of coal requires disposal of 
"overburden," a material that must be removed in order to mine 
coal, without damaging water sources or filling in wetlands. Such 
13. AM. LUNG AsS'N, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT STUDIES OF THE 
HEALTH EFFECTS OF OZONE AIR POLLUTION 1997-2001, at 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.lungusa.org!atflcfl{7ABD42C2-FCCA-4604-BADE-7F5D5E762256}1 
OZONE_HEALTH97-01.PDF. 
14. EPA, Impacts of NOx, supra note 12. 
15. Id. 
16. [d. 
17. Sierra Club, Clean Air Factsheet: Dirty Coal Power, at 
http://www.sierraclub.org!cleanair/factsheetslpower.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 
2005). 
lB. CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER, supra note 6, at 7. 
19. EPA, Mercury: Controlling Power Plant Emissions; Overview, at 
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/controLemissionsiindex.htm (last updated Mar. 17, 
2005). 
20. EPA, Mercury: Human Health, at http://www.epa.gov/mercury/ 
health.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2004). 
21. See EPA, FACTSHEET: NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH ADVISORIES 4 (2004), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/advisorieslfactsheet.pdf. 
22. CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER, supra note 6, at B. 
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side effects have been a problem in the past. 23 Further, when 
mining results in the exposure of pyrite, which is commonly found in 
rocks containing coal seams, to air and water, it results in the 
formation of sulfuric acid and iron hydroxide. When rainwater 
washes over these rocks, the water runoff, which becomes acidified, 
can harm the soil, rivers and streams.24 Abandoned mines are also a 
considerable problem. There are environmental problems caused by 
abandoned mines in each of the twenty-nine states and tribal lands 
with coal mines.25 
All of these environmental threats and others are subject to 
government regulation intended to reduce or mitigate them. 
Nevertheless, environmental advocates contend that the magnitude 
of current problems is greater than it would be if there were more 
effective laws and enforcement.26 While we agree with that 
conclusion, we also think that continued reliance on the Traditional 
Model of electricity generation and distribution is a culprit and that 
efforts to reform the Traditional Model are unlikely to improve the 
situation. To understand why this is the case, we turn next to the 
rise and reformulation of the Traditional Model. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL 
The electricity industry-like other network industries, such as 
telecommunications and natural gas-has exhibited a discernable 
historic pattern.27 That pattern is the result of a combination of 
technological developments, economic theory, and supporting 
government regulations.28 Regardless of the particular network 
industry, these three elements have given rise to an industrial 
structure and a regulatory regime with remarkable persistence. 
Indeed, United States energy policy is dominated by that industrial 
23. Envtl. Literacy Council, Coal Mining, at http://www.enviroliteracy. 
org/article.php/1122.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2004). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Dirty Skies: The Bush 
Administration's Air Pollution Plan, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/ 
pollutionlqbushplan.asp (last revised Sept. 5, 2003). 
27. See generally JOSE A. GoMEz-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: 
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003); Joseph P. Tomain, 
networkindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. RAN. L. REV. 829 (2000) (discussing the parallel 
historical development of the transportation, communications, financial, and 
energy industries). 
28. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great 
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1383-
1403 (1998). 
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structure and regulatory regime,29 and public utilities, including 
electricity, have been a part of that system. 
In this section, we briefly describe the technological, 
commercial, and legal developments that gave rise to the 
Traditional Model and the changes in these elements that have 
spurred the current effort to restructure electricity markets. We 
find that the current focus is on creating competitive generation 
markets and the capacity to move electricity generated in those 
markets around the country. Much less attention is being paid to 
taking advantage of the disintegration of the Traditional Model to 
adopt more environmentally friendly methods of electricity 
generation and consumption. 
A. Brief History 
The story of electricity is a particularly interesting one, 
involving colorful characters from the very inception of the industry 
right up until today's headlines. Imagine the classic American 
inventor Thomas Edison toiling at his workshop in Menlo Park, New 
Jersey, inventing the incandescent light bulb. While this picture of 
Edison is an accurate one, it is also a partial one. Edison was a 
remarkable inventor; he was also quite a business genius. Once the 
incandescent light bulb was invented, it was necessary to illuminate 
that bulb with electricity. Edison's plan to use the dynamo,30 a 
29. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy 
Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990). 
30. The most literary description of the machine that creates electricity is 
in a chapter called "The Dynamo and the Virgin" in HENRY ADAMS, THE 
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1907), reprinted in HENRY 
ADAMS, NOVELS, MONT SAINT MICHEL; THE EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY: AN 
AMERICAN NOVEL, ESTHER: A NOVEL, MONT SAINT MICHEL AND CHARTRES, THE 
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS, POEMS, at 1067 (Library of America ed., 1983): 
To him, the dynamo itself was but an ingenious channel for conveying 
somewhere the heat latent in a few tons of poor coal hidden in a dirty 
engine-house carefully kept out of sight; but to Adams the dynamo 
became a symbol of infinity. As he grew accustomed to the great 
gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral 
force, much as the early Christians felt the Cross. The planet itself 
seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, annual or 
daily revolution, than this huge wheel, revolving within arm's length, 
at some vertiginous speed, and barely murmuring,-scarcely 
humming an audible warning to stand a hair's-breadth further for 
respect of power,-while it would not wake the baby lying close 
against its frame. Before the end, one began to pray to it; inherited 
instinct taught the natural expression of man before silent and 
infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of ultimate energy, the 
dynamo was not so human as some, but it was the most expressive. 
[d. at 1067. 
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turbine motor, to generate electricity, came to fruition on September 
4, 1882 in Lower Manhattan at Pearl Street Station.31 On that day, 
the electric industry was born. Edison flipped the switch on the 
country's first central power station thus serving eighty-five 
customers with four hundred electric lamps.32 
While it is the case that Edison did not invent either the electric 
light or electricity, it was his particular genius to develop product 
distribution.33 Edison's business genius was the construction of the 
distribution system to deliver the electricity to light the lights. More 
specifically, Edison favored direct current ("DC") electricity because 
of its safer low voltage. Edison's commitment to direct current, 
ironically, could have ended his career because that commitment 
created serious competitors who recognized that DC electricity had 
severe technological limitations.34 Specifically, DC could be used to 
transmit low voltage electricity only for short distances.35 
In order to transmit higher-voltage electricity longer distances, 
a technological fix was necessary. High-voltage electricity had to be 
converted to lower voltages so that it could be distributed to end 
users. This change in voltage was mediated through a transformer 
which depended upon alternating current ("AC"). Nicola Tesla 
invented just such an AC system. Tesla, fired by Edison, went to 
work for George Westinghouse, a keen Pittsburgh inventor and 
entrepreneur, who saw the value in AC.36 As the story goes, Edison 
was so enamored with DC that he hired somebody to develop an AC 
electric chair as to prove how dangerous and undesirable AC 
electricity was.37 
The ACIDC battle is more than a story of rival technologies; it 
involves the development of the electricity industry. In short, at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, the electric industry was competitive 
and highly localized. Since electricity could be transmitted longer 
distances, however, the economics of competition changed 
dramatically. The most significant person to recognize the changing 
31 JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT: EDISON, TEsLA, WESTINGHOUSE, AND THE 
RACE TO ELECTRIFY THE WORLD 84-85 (2003). 
32. LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FuTuRE 117 (7th ed. 2000). 
33. Id. at 115-17. 
34. See JONNES, supra note 31, at 144-46, 150-63, 179-83. 
35. Ironically, as today's electricity policy discussions focus on more 
localized generation, there is renewed interest in DC electricity connections to 
the grid. See PETER VAN DOREN & JERRY TAYLOR, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS 
No. 530: RETHINKING ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING 10 (2004), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubslpaslpa530.pdf; infra notes 79-80 & accompanying text. 
36. JONNES, supra note 31, at 153-63. 
37. Id. at 197-98. 
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economics of the electric industry at the time was Samuel Insull, 
who had also once worked for Thomas Edison. Insull recognized 
that profits could be made in the electric industry once two 
fundamental costs were recouped: fixed costs and operating costs.3S 
The electric industry, like other network industries, has high 
front-end capital costs. Significant investment must be made in 
plants and equipment before production can begin. These capital 
costs are particularly sensitive in the electric industry because it is 
difficult to store electricity in any significant quantity. You need 
only think of the battery on your laptop computer to realize how 
frequently it must be charged. Because end users for manufacturing 
purposes or home convenience need a reliable supply of electricity, it 
became necessary to build sufficient generation plants so that 
service could be delivered without interruption. Additionally, 
generation plants are expensive, costing millions of dollars at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and hundreds of millions of 
dollars today. Thus, there are high fixed costs. By comparison, 
there are comparatively low operating costs, including costs for fuel, 
labor and the like. Nevertheless, both of these costs need to be 
recouped in order to have a profitable firm. 
Insull recognized that by charging users relatively higher prices 
at the beginning of a use period and then lowering prices with more 
consumption, he could capture both fixed and operating costs. Such 
a pricing scheme also induces consumption. Insull was a 
remarkably successful businessman, perhaps too successful. As his 
electricity conglomerate grew, he created a series of holding 
companies along a pyramid scheme. Those holding companies 
created enormous profits right up until the Great Crash of 1929, 
after which time Insull was accused of stock manipulation and 
fraud. Insull fled the country only to return to face trial. Insull was 
acquitted of all charges but never recovered his good name, and he 
died a pauper. Today, Insull's legacy is that the industry operates 
under holding company restrictions.39 However, the scandal du 
jour-Kenneth Lay and Enron-bears remarkable similarities to 
Insull's empire. 40 
The point of this brief history is a simple one. The electric 
industry started competitively. However, technological change gave 
rise to a change in corporate form primarily through concentration, 
which led to manipulation. And with manipulation came cries for 
38. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 122. 
39. As a result of Insull's market manipulation, Congress passed the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (2000). 
40. See Richard D. Cudahy, Insult and Enron: Is There a Parallel? (pts. 1-
3), INFRASTRUCTURE, Spring 2003, at 3, Summer 2003, at 1, Fall 2003, at 7. 
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government regulation.41 It is at this point in the electricity story 
that economic theory takes the stage, for economic theory justified 
government regulation. 
Insull's economic instincts were not wrong. Concentration is 
more efficient for certain industries according to the economic theory 
of naturat" monopoly. Natural monopoly can be most simply defined 
as a situation in which, for some period of time, product costs "will 
be lower if they consist in a single supplier.,,42 While there are more 
technical definitions of natural monopoly,43 the simple, fundamental 
idea is that a single firm can realize economies of scale throughout a 
range of production, thus continually lowering product cost. The 
idea is straightforward: It is wasteful for a firm to make large 
capital investments in facilities that will duplicate another firm's 
facilities. There is no need to have multiple sets of telephone lines, 
electric lines, or natural gas pipelines serving the same geographic 
area because the duplicate sets are inefficient and will go to waste.44 
It is fair to note that the concept of natural monopoly is hardly 
universally accepted,45 although it has been accepted in law. 
41. Historically, there has been debate about whether public utility 
regulation was undertaken for the benefit of the public along a public interest 
model of regulation or was undertaken at the behest of the utilities themselves 
along a capture theory model. See WERNER TROESKEN, WHY REGULATE 
UTILITIES?: THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE CHICAGO GAS INDUSTRY, 
1849-1924, at 3-4 (1996); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: 
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1998); 
George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of 
Regulation" Debate, 36 J. L. & ECON. 289, 289-90 (1993); Thomas P. Lyon, 
Capture or Contract?: The Early Years of Electric Utility Regulation 1-3 (Jan. 
30, 2003) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers. 
cfm ?abstracUd=375628. 
42. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 11 (1970). 
43. See generally SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL 
MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21-24 (1988); WILLIAM W. 
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 2-4 (1982); ROGER SHERMAN, THE 
REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 81 (1989); W. KIp VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 80-81 (2d ed. 1995); Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of 
Natural Monopolies, in HANDBOOK OF LAw AND ECONOMICS 1, 7-8 (A.M. Polinsky 
& S. Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005), available at http://econ-www.mit.edul 
faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1086. 
44. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 
119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (describing the "wasteful duplication of 
facilities" created by the "competitive free-for-all" that exists before a single 
provider emerges from the struggle to serve the whole market). 
45. For a critique of natural monopoly, see Peter Z. Grossman, Is Anything 
a Natural Monopoly?, in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 11-39 (Peter Z. Grossman & 
Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & 
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The United States Supreme Court, drawing on earlier English 
precedent, accepted the idea of natural monopoly in the case of 
Munn v. Illinois,46 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
an Illinois statute regulating the prices charged by grain elevator 
operators against a takings challenge.47 Grain elevators would 
purchase and store farmers' grain and then resell it for a profit. 48 
Because the grain elevators were an effective oligopoly, the farmers 
argued that they were being overcharged for storage. In response, 
the Illinois legislature decided to regulate the prices charged by the 
operators. Munn stands for the proposition that there are certain 
industries "affected with a public interest')49 whose prices can be 
regulated for the public good. To satisfy the test in Munn, a 
proposed price regulation must show first that the industry exhibits 
monopolistic tendencies and second that the industry is affected 
with a public interest. Electricity clearly satisfies both tests: Insull's 
consolidated electricity empire demonstrated that it could exercise 
monopoly power, and legislators around the country found that the 
public enjoyed the comforts of the product. Regulation, then, was 
not far behind. 
Thus far, we have shown how technological innovation and 
economic theory contributed to the development of the electricity 
industry. We now look at how government regulation responded to 
those developments and how it has contributed to our current 
industrial structure. 
Again, we can turn to Insull for the central insight into how and 
why the government regulated the electric industry the way that it 
did. It is the case that a single producer of electricity can produce 
electricity at a lower cost than multiple producers. However, that 
single producer most likely will become a monopolist. The 
regulatory response to this exercise of monopoly power may seem 
counterintuitive. The regulatory response was to impose a 
government-sanctioned monopoly on that single provider through 
what has come to be known as the regulatory compact.50 The terms 
of the compact are fairly simple. An electric utility is given an 
exclusive franchise area and is obligated to provide service within 
that franchise area. The government, to counteract monopolistic 
ECON. 55, 56-59 (1968). 
46. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
47. Id. at 135-36. 
48. Id. at 117-18. 
49. Id. at 126. 
50. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J. concurring); J. GREGORY SmAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, 
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE 
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1997). 
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pricing, is then given ratemaking authority over the electric utility. 
Ratemaking is a shorthand way of saying that the government 
controls utility prices and profits. Recall Insull's understanding of 
utility economics as encompassing the need to cover both fixed and 
operating costs and doing so through high charges at the beginning 
of a user's consumption. Government regulators bought this theory 
wholesale in the rate making process. 
To encourage continued investment in utilities, regulators 
designed what we refer to as the traditional rate formula that 
allowed utilities to recover operating costs and a return on 
investment on all capital costs. Such ratemaking is a form of cost-
plus pricing. Known as cost-of-service ("COS") ratemaking, the 
traditional formula functioned in such a way that as long as a public 
utility operated prudently and, for the most part, as long as 
customers received service, then a utility would stay in business.51 
COS ratemaking had another feature which favored industrial 
growth and expansion: declining block rate design. Utility 
customers are charged for the amount of electricity that they 
consume and for the cost of providing the service. However, as we 
will develop in much more detail in Part V, customers do not pay for 
exactly the electricity that they consume at the time that they 
consume it. Rather, they pay an average cost and do so in "blocks." 
Again, Insull had the central insight. Customers, under the 
declining block rate design, pay more for the first block of electricity 
that they consume and less for additional blocks. 52 In this way, the 
utility has the opportunity to recover the more expensive capital 
costs in the beginning of the consumption period before going on to 
recover operating costs. 
For an investor, COS ratemaking may look too good to be true. 
Although there was no guarantee that a profit would be made, rarely 
were profits lost. For many years the market reflected this low risk 
51. See generally J. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC UTILITY RATES 
(2d ed. 1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PuBLIC UTILITIES: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 435-36 (3d ed. 1993); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. 
TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAw AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 107-15 (3d ed. 
2003). 
52. By way of example, assume that a consumer uses 2000 kilowatt-hours 
("kWh") in a month. Under a declining block rate design, they would then pay: 
1st 650 kWh 4.782¢ 
Next 350 kWh 4.104¢ 
Over 1,000 kWh 4.040¢ 
Total $85.847 
Combined, the average rate is $0.0427 per kWh. This rate design is such that 
the more a user consumes, the less costly the electricity becomes, thus 
encouraging consumption. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 289. 
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investment with low, although reliable, rates of return to utility 
investors, and every diversified portfolio contained some utility 
stocks or bonds. 53 
The situation of reliable utility returns existed for most of the 
twentieth century, and utilities were considered safe investments as 
electricity rates stayed flat or even declined as the industry 
expanded. In the mid-1960s, however, the industry experienced 
another transformation, a transformation with which we continue to 
wrestle.54 Until that time, particularly after World War II, 
electricity production and consumption increased at a predictable 
seven percent annual rate. After the mid-1960s, however, the 
industry and the world changed. The electricity demand growth 
rate slowed, energy costs increased, world energy prices were 
thrown into disarray for various political reasons, and regulators 
began to question COS ratemaking and the prevailing declining 
block rate design. A simple way of understanding the cataclysm 
that the electric industry was experiencing is to realize that one 
cannot continue to invest capital forever. There will come a point at 
which further investment is unwise because it is inefficient. The 
limit of utility investments was modeled by two economists, Harvey 
Averch and Leland Johnson. 55 
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the suspicion was that the 
electric industry had over-built and that it had significant excess 
capacity. Historically, because of the need to provide electricity on 
demand and because of an obligation for reliable service, the 
industry would over-build and have its excess capacity accounted for 
in what is known as a reserve margin. In other words, a utility 
invested in an excess plant so that it could satisfy demand. That 
excess plant constituted the reserve margin. Historic reserve 
margins during the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s ranged 
from 23.8% to 31.8% and fell to 19.9% during the 1990s.56 The 
question then became: Were the reserve margins too high, and could 
they be lowered? The suspicion was that they were too high and 
that the possibility existed for lower cost electricity. The problem, 
however, was that utilities were granted government protected 
franchises, thus discouraging new entrants. The electric industry 
was surprised by the reaction to a piece of legislation known as the 
53. BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND 
TECHNIQUE 1-20,264-307 (1962). 
54. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 163-79. 
55. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
56. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 33 tb1.3-1. Reserve margins peaked in 
the early 1980s and have been declining ever since. [d. at 63 fig.6-1. 
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Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"),57 which was part 
of President Jimmy Carter's National Energy Act legislation of 
1978.58 
The National Energy Act was intended to be comprehensive and 
to respond to the energy crises that affected energy prices and the 
economy more generally during the 1970s.59 President Carter's 
legislation had several purposes, including responding to growing 
dependence on foreign oil, finding alternative sources of energy, and 
engaging in resource conservation and energy preservation 
measures. PURPA was intended to experiment with innovative 
ratemaking and rate designs. 
PURPA was intended to move away from COS ratemaking and 
to try market-based rate strategies. As part of the rate regulation 
reform, PURPA encouraged new forms of electricity generation, 
including the promotion of small power producers and co-
generators.60 Co-generation is the situation in which the 
manufacturer generates excess heat from its manufacturing activity, 
which can then be converted into electricity. Small power 
producers, generators of eighty megawatts ("MW") and less, and co-
generators were encouraged to enter the market and to connect to 
the local public utility with a guarantee that the local public utility 
would pay for the electricity generated by these two "qualifying 
facilities" at the utilities' own avoided cost. In other words, these 
new producers would produce electricity more cheaply than that 
produced by the local utility, but the local utility would pay the 
producers the utilities' production cost, not the production cost of the 
d 61 new pro ucers. 
What has been referred to as "PURPA's surprise,,62 is that 
57. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,92 
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, & 
43 U.S.C.). 
58. Id.; Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174-3205 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.); National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206-88 (1978); Natural 
Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350-3411 (1978); Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289-3349. 
59. The key events were the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and the Iranian 
Embargo in 1979. See, e.g., PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF OIL 100 (2004). 
60. "Co-generation facility" is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (2000); 
"small power production facility" is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A). See also 
Michael J. Zimmer, Cogeneration and Independent Power Production, in 3 
ENERGY LAw AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.01-.16 (David J. Muchow & William A. 
Mogel eds., 2003). 
61. See, e.g., Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Servo Corp., 461 U.S. 
402, 406 (1983). 
62. Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 
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suspicions about excess capacity were real, new entrants desired to 
enter the market, and the industry was more competitive than was 
assumed. As a result, electricity "deregulation" began in earnest. 
We put the word deregulation in quotation marks to emphasize the 
fact that the industry is experiencing a restructuring rather than 
deregulation. What is being deregulated or what is attempting to be 
deregulated is the pricing of electricity at the wholesale and retail 
levels. To date, the restructuring is continuing at the wholesale 
level and has been largely discontinued at the retail level. Through 
a series of FERC rule-makings, the industry is indeed being 
restructured at the wholesale and at the interstate levels.63 The 
restructuring activities in the states have come to something of a 
halt as a result of the crisis in California in the summer of 2000.64 
You may notice that until this point of electricity history, most of the 
effort has been on production. This production focus has operated 
under the belief that a strong pattern of energy consumption 
indicates a strong economy.65 Nevertheless, the industry cannot 
ENVTL. L. 435, 451-53 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Past and Future]; Joseph P. 
Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 242, 
244 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Persistence]. 
63. The key regulations are F.E.RC. Order No. 888; Order No. 889; and 
Order 2000. F.E.RC. Order 888, 18 C.F.R §§ 35 & 385 (1996); F.E.RC. Order 
889-A, 18 C.F.R. § 37 (1997); F.E.RC. Order 889-B, 18 C.F.R § 37 (1997); 
F.E.RC. Order 2000, 18 C.F.R § 35 (1999). For discussions on how these 
orders operate, see Reinier H.J.H. Lock & Marlene L. Stein, Electricity 
Transmission, in 3 ENERGY LAw & TRANSACTIONS §§ 81.01-.05 (David J. Muchow 
& William A. Mogel eds., 1996); Floyd L. Norton IV & Gregory W. Camet, 
Electricity: Open Access, Transmission & Comparability, in 4 ENERGY LAw & 
TRANSACTIONS §§ 82.02-.05 (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2004). 
64. Mike Stenglein, The Causes of California's Energy Crisis, 16 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 237,273 (2002); Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 62, at 
439-42; James F. Wilson, Restructuring the Electric Power Industry: Past 
Problems, Future Directions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 232, 232 (2002). 
65. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A 
DURABLE PEACE 3-24 (1977) (describing and critiquing the claim that there is a 
positive correspondence between energy consumption and economic growth). 
Today there is increasing interest in promoting strong economies through the 
consumption of less energy. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE PROGRESSIVE 
PRIORITIES SERIES: SECURING OUR ENERGY FuTURE (2004) [hereinafter CAP, 
SECURING ENERGY FuTURE], available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atflcfl 
{E9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03}IENERGYCHAPTERpdf; 
ENERGY FuTURE COALITION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A NEW 
ENERGY FuTuRE 27-29, 86-100 (2003) [hereinafter EFC, CHALLENGE AND 
OPPORTUNITY], available at http://www.energyfuture coalition.org/pubslEFC 
%20Report.pdf; NAT'L COMM'N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY 
STALEMATE: A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA'S ENERGY CHALLENGES 
(2004) [hereinafter NCEP, STALEMATE], available at 
http://www .energycommission.org/ewebeditpro/itemsl082F4682. pdf; JAMES 
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function without transmission and distribution, which means that 
the consumption end of the fuel cycle comes into play. 
B. Traditional Electric Utility Regulation 
Physics, firm structure, and markets combined to create what 
we all know as the standard local public utility. Two physical 
characteristics are key here. First, as mentioned earlier, electricity 
cannot be stored effectively. Next, electricity follows the path of 
least resistance rather than the shortest path. Because electrons 
travel literally near the speed of light, once a switch is turned on the 
electricity that is used can come from anywhere on the grid. 
Consequently, electricity lacks the property characteristics that 
make it amenable to bilateral contract sales. In other words, most 
purchasers do not buy specific electricity from a specific producer. 
Instead, consumers purchase from the grid, and the grid, in turn, 
has the property characteristics of a commons.66 These two physical 
characteristics, then, require that sufficient electricity is available to 
satisfy demand instantaneously. 
The firm structure that is consistent with those physical 
characteristics, for most of the twentieth century, was the vertically-
integrated electric utility.' The local public utility, until relatively 
recently, functioned as a vertically-integrated, investor-owned 
business, known in the industry as an "IOU." IOU's engaged in 
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution. In other 
words, the public utility produced the electricity and delivered it to 
end-use customers. 
Natural monopoly theory neatly complemented both the 
physical characteristics and the structure of the electric industry. 
Local public utilities, as noted above, were in fact state-protected 
monopolies that were regulated with the traditional COS rate 
formula enabling them to continue to invest capital to provide 
reliable and universal service. Most notably, capital investments 
were encouraged so that utilities had sufficient capacity to provide 
electricity during periods of peak demand. The world of the 
traditional public utility was a satisfying one for all actors for a good 
part of last century.67 Shareholders were happy because they were 
BARRETT ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, JOBS AND THE CLIMATE 
STEWARDSHIP ACT: How CURBING GLOBAL WARMING CAN INCREASE EMPLOYMENT 
(2005), available at http://www.nrdc.orglgolobalwarminglcsalcsajobs.pdf; U.S. 
PIRG EDUC. FuND, REDIRECTING AMERICA'S ENERGY: THE ECONOMIC AND 
CONSUMER BENEFITS OF CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES 10-16 (2005), available at 
http://newenergyfuture.com/reportslredirectingamericasenergy . pdf. 
66. VANDoREN & TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 6-7. 
67. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 151-61. 
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earning reliable returns on their investment; managers were happy 
as the plant continued to be built and managed; consumers were 
happy because rates were reasonable, stayed flat, and on occasion 
declined; and regulators were happy because there was both little to 
do and what business they had was not politically controversia1.68 
This happy situation changed when costs (and rates) began to rise in 
the mid-1960s due to a number of factors.69 The steady growth in 
demand began to vary downward. Many utilities were faced with 
nuclear power plants that were much more expensive than 
anticipated.70 Given the traditional rate formula, utility executives 
were faced with quite a problem. Should they throw good money 
after bad and complete the nuclear plant, convert it to a coal 
generation unit, or cancel construction entirely?71 The energy crises 
of the 1970s exacerbated the problem of rising costs as the country 
experienced double digit inflation. Environmental regulations also 
added to a utility's costs. As a direct consequence of inflation and 
additional regulations, capital costs rose as well. And, as rates rose, 
consumers complained. 
As noted, the electric industry, as traditionally structured and 
regulated, works well as long as the industry is expanding. Once, 
however, costs rise because of either reaching a technological 
plateau or reaching capacity, then the market can become distorted 
and inefficient. Consumers can consequently suffer because they 
are paying higher than efficient rates for electricity. The electricity 
industry experienced exactly this confluence of events. In brief, 
utilities had accumulated excess capacity, had built expensive 
plants, and under the COS formula, were charging customers for 
those additional costs. These events combined to put significant 
pressures on politicians and regulators to address rising electricity 
rates. 
In the mid-1970s, after a period of significant inflation and two 
energy crises, industry deregulation generally, and electric industry 
deregulation in particular, became a significant matter for 
68. WILLIAM GoRMLEY, THE POLITICS OF PuBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 7 
(1983). 
69. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 163-79. 
70. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 29-54 (1987); 
Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?, 
34 HAsTINGS L.J. 1133, 1141-43 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory 
Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504 (1984). 
71. See Richard J. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the 
Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2049 
(1989). 
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legislative attention.72 The deregulation of telecommunications, 
railroads, banking, and trucking, as well as energy industries, was 
looked on as the way to improve markets and improve consumer 
choice.73 In some of those markets, deregulation was seen to have 
exactly those effects. Airline deregulation, for example, increased 
consumer choice, increased the number of flights, and introduced 
various discount plans. Telecommunications deregulation witnessed 
a "revolution" in innovation, choice, and lower rates. In other 
markets, most notably for our purposes electricity, deregulation has 
not been as smooth. 
Deregulation in the electricity industry as a result of FERC 
initiatives, both on the electric and natural gas sides of its docket, 
began at the wholesale level and has moved to the distribution 
segment of the industry. In order to have a completely deregulated 
electricity market, of course, it is necessary that the retail segment 
of the market be deregulated as well, and retail deregulation is a 
story that is yet to develop, let alone conclude.74 
Deregulation across the electricity industry presents problems. 
It is fair to say that electricity deregulation at the wholesale level 
can proceed. PURPA and experiments with alternative energy 
sources such as renewable energy indicate that there are additional 
electricity suppliers. The significant amount of merger and 
acquisition activity in the industry shows that the market is viable,75 
72. TOMAIN, supra note 70, at 11-12, 102-34; see also Bernard S. Black & 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in 
Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1343-50 
(1993) (describing changes to electricity markets and the enactment of 
legislation in the 1970s); Alfred E. Kahn, Electric Deregulation: Defining and 
Ensuring Fair Competition, ELECTRICITY J. (April 1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and 
Electricity, 15 ENERGyL.J. 323,324 (1994). 
73. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION: 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH (2004) (comparing the 
relative effectiveness of the deregulation and regulatory policies in the airline 
and telecommunications industries); DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: 
WHAT'S NEXT? (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) (analyzing the 
deregulation and remammg regulation of the airline, railroad, 
telecommunications, and energy industries). 
74. KENNETH ROSE, 2004 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER 
MARKETS 1-2 to -4 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
hepg/Papers/Rose.2004. perf. review .elec.mkts.0804. pdf. 
75. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman & John R. Emshwiller, For Exelon, PSEG 
Might Be Big Boost, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A3; Eric Dash, Exelon Plans 
to Buy New Jersey Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C2; Jad Mouawad & 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Biggest Utility in New Jersey Seen as Target of 
Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2004, at C1 (reporting the potential acquisition 
of New Jersey's largest utility, P.S.E.&G., by the Exelon Corporation, an owner 
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and even with the collapse of Enron, energy futures trading 
continues and should continue to be healthy.76 
All of this activity pertains to the generation segment of the 
industry. Deregulation oftransmission (and distribution) and retail 
segments, including consumption, remains problematic. 
Transmission is problematic as it continues to be a natural 
monopoly. 77 Nevertheless, FERC initiatives are attempting to 
organize reliable and accessible grids as will be described 
immediately below. Distribution is problematic as states' and the 
federal government's experiment with "unbundling" vehicles affects 
the corporate structure of distribution companies. The California 
energy crisis has given retail reformers pause, and there can be no 
effective retail deregulation without unfettered access to the grid. 
The consumption end of the fuel cycle presents difficulties 
because all customers are not similarly situated. There are some 
consumers, particularly large industrial customers, who would like 
to have access to various suppliers and can negotiate adequate 
contracts for themselves. Large suppliers and consumers can use 
long-term contracts, spot markets, and futures markets to provide 
for their electricity needs. Small customers and residential 
consumers, however, run into problems of pricing and reliability. 
Under the traditional rate formula, these smaller consumers were 
the beneficiaries of cross-subsidization, which lowers their real 
rates. In a completely deregulated market all consumers will pay 
their full electricity costs. 
C. Summary 
A safe assumption about the electricity future is that the 
Traditional Model will continue for some time. Nuclear power 
accounts for twenty percent of the electricity produced in the 
country, and coal reserves are sufficient to last for 250, 500, or even 
1,000 years depending on who is making the reserve estimates. In 
addition, the national electricity grid is necessary for transmission 
and distribution, and large producers can produce more cheaply. 
Nevertheless, the conversation has moved on to what will 
replace the Traditional Model, and this question involves a number 
of a number of electric utilities and an experienced manager of nuclear plants);. 
see also VIJAY V. V AITHEESWARAN, POWER TO THE PEoPLE 280 (2003). 
76. See, e.g., DTE Energy Trading, at http://www.dteenergytrading.com 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (advertising its services as an "active physical gas and 
power marketing company"). 
77. Joseph P. Tomain, Whither Natutal Monopoly? The Case of Electricity, 
in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
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of important issues. Indeed, contemporary energy policy discussions 
involve fundamental concerns of a different kind from those that 
occupied most of the twentieth century. Today, energy policy 
discussions involve growing concern about the availability and the 
price of oil,7B global climate change/9 terrorism,BO and international 
markets as well as a healthy energy economy.S1 By way of 
shorthand, energy policy today must address energy, the 
environment, and security.B2 Most significantly, today's policy 
discussions must address how interconnected these variables have 
become. Clearly, continuing the Traditional Model presents 
difficulties in each area. The Traditional Model has become too 
costly, the United States is a net importer of oil, the Traditional 
Model especially relative to coal-fired generation has contributed to 
environment harms, and the Traditional Model is prone to energy 
and national security threats. 
Our aim is to contribute to the discussion about the future of 
energy policy by focusing on what a Smart Model of electricity 
generation and consumption can contribute to national well-being. 
In the next part, we discuss how a Smart Model would change the 
78. See, e.g., AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., WINNING THE OIL ENDGAME: 
INNOVATION FOR PROFITS, JOBS, AND SECURITY (2005), available at 
http://www.oilendgame/org/pdfsIWtOEg_72dpi.pdf; PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF 
OIL: ON THE EDGE OF A PERILOUS NEW WORLD (2004). 
79. See, e.g., INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, MEETING THE CLIMATE 
CHALLENGE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
TASKFORCE (2005), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atficfl% 
7bE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7d1CLIMATECHALLENGE. 
PDF; see also Press Release, Int'l Climate Change Taskforce, G8-Plus Group 
Needed to Tackle Climate Change, at http://www.ippr.org.uk/ 
pressreleasesiarchive.asp?id=1264&flD=62 (Jan. 24, 2005) (urging G8 leaders 
to make greenhouse gas reduction a top priority). 
80. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM 55-56 (2004). 
81. See generally CAP, SECURING ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 65; EFC, 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65; NCEP, STALEMATE, supra note 65; 
see also New Thinking on Energy Policy: Meeting the Challenges of Security, 
Development, and Climate Change, Conference Proceedings of a William J. 
Clinton Presidential Foundation Conference (Dec. 6, 2004). A video of the 
forum can be found at http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/feature-energy-
120604.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). Of increasing concern is the demand for 
energy, particularly oil and natural gas, by China and India. See, e.g., Keith 
Bradsher, 2 Big Appetites Take Seats at the Oil Table, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2005, at C1; see also Simon Romero & Jad Mouwad, Saudis in Strategy to 
Export More Oil to India and China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at C4. 
82. We use "security" in two senses. First, the energy policy is concerned 
with reliable energy supplies to keep the nation independent, particularly from 
imported oil. Second, the country's energy system must be secure from terrorist 
activities. 
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way in which we generate and distribute electricity. Part V 
discusses how a Smart Model would change the way in which we 
consume electricity. 
IV. THE SMART GENERATION MODEL 
In this Part, we discuss four prominent examples of generation 
of electricity under a Smart Model: distributed generation, 
renewable energy, renewable portfolio standards, and the Smart 
Grid. All of these options are potential improvements in the 
generation and delivery of electricity that respond to the concerns 
about energy, the environment, and security. While these ideas 
have been part of energy policy discussions for many years, they 
have stayed at the periphery of those discussions, mostly because 
they have been too costly and have not passed a market test. To 
date, investors have been reluctant to invest in these alternatives 
because they have not been promised a sufficient return on their 
investment. 
One reason, we believe, for the limited attractiveness of Smart 
Model generation options is the lack of accurate price signals in 
electricity markets. Through greater price accuracy, which we 
discuss in the next Part of the article, consumers can make smarter 
consumption choices, producers can make smarter investment 
decisions, and the industry can perform more efficiently. Simply, 
COS ratemaking can no longer be relied upon to continue to 
regulate the industry. Instead, we examine marginal cost pricing 
and real time pricing models that are intended to bring prices closer 
to the market and are intended to give consumers more accurate 
price signals. 
One other preliminary observation is pertinent. Each of the 
alternatives that we discuss must connect with the transmission 
and distribution grid to greater or lesser degrees. Distributed 
generation needs backup access to backup power. Renewable 
resources need to connect with the market. Renewable energy 
portfolios have the same needs. And, the Smart Grid is an improved 
grid. In other words, as much as we might like to get away from the 
Traditional Model, the grid remains central to the electricity 
industry, and the grid retains its natural monopoly characteristic, 
thus necessitating regulation in one form or another.83 The grid will 
remain a necessary component until electricity production and 
distribution become localized, and that decentralization is starting 
through distributed generation.84 
83. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text; see also VAN DOREN & 
TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 10. 
84. See, e.g, John D. Kueck et al., Tapping Distributed Energy Resources, 
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A. Distributed GenerationB5 
Distributed generation ("DG") is an alternative source of 
electricity generation that focuses on small-scale power production.86 
The core concept behind DG is that power will be produced locally, 
instead of relying on large regional grids for transmission and 
distribution. DG power producers will be much smaller and will rely 
on a variety of energy sources and technologies such as solar cells 
and wind turbines. 
DG technologies include gas or diesel-fired engines, small 
turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic cells.87 While some of these fuel 
sources are fossil fuels, it is contemplated that DG technologies will 
capture both heat and power, thereby increasing energy efficiency. 
Other fuel sources are renewable and therefore cleaner than the 
fossil fuels burned in large-scale plants. 
DG and micropower are dependent upon significant 
technological improvements throughout electricity production, 
transmission, distribution, storage, and consumption. Most simply, 
the scale of generation units is reduced significantly, and they are 
widely dispersed.88 "Smart energy" technologies are intended to 
reduce the size of power generation units, to be closer to the source 
of consumption, to utilize "Smart Grids" which will transmit power 
more efficiently, and to use "smart meters" which will provide 
consumers with more information about their consumption patterns 
and about their choice ofproviders.89 
Another term for DG is micropower, which also involves new 
technologies including microturbines, hydrogen fuels, solar cells, 
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2004, at 46,47. 
85. Portions of this subpart of the Article also appear in Joseph P. Tomain, 
Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. (forthcoming Spring 2005). 
86. The International Energy Agency defmes "distributed generation" as: 
generating plant serving a customer on-site or providing support to a 
distribution network, connected to the grid at distribution-level 
voltages. The technologies generally include engines, small (and 
micro) turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic systems. It generally 
excludes wind power, since that is mostly produced on wind farms 
rather than for on-site power requirements. 
lNT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN LIBERALISED ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS 19 (2002), available at http://www.iea.org/textbaseinppdflfreei2000/ 
distributed2002.pdf [hereinafter lEA, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION]; see also SETH 
DUNN, WORLDWATCH INST., MICROPOWER: THE NEXT ELECTRICAL ERA; 
WORLDWATCH PAPER 151 (Jane A. Peterson ed., 2000), available at 
http://www.worldwatch.org/pubslpaperI1511.html. 
87. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 86, at 25-26 tbl.l; VAITHEESWARAN, 
supra note 75, at 35-37. 
88. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 75, at 40-43. 
89. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, app.A4, at 74-85. 
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landfill gases, and the like. In this regard, micropower is touted as 
a clean energy alternative. According to the International Energy 
Agency, these technologies are increasing in importance. For 
example, "[w]orldwide, more DG capacity was ordered in 2000 than 
. 90 [the capacity ordered] for new nuclear power." Not too much 
should be taken from that statement because of the decrease in 
orders for new nuclear plants. Still, it is fair to assert that we are 
witnessing a worldwide rise in DG and micropower.91 
Smart electricity policy is a return to the electricity future. 
When Edison flipped the switch at Pearl Street Station in New York 
City in 1882, the first electricity company went into operation and 
did so on a small scale.92 Technological advances enabled the 
effective nationalization of the electricity grid in the early part of the 
twentieth century.93 Today, we find ourselves contemplating a 
return to small scale because it promises economic efficiencies by 
removing producers from the grid, environmental benefits through 
greater energy efficiencies and increased use of renewable energy 
resources, and energy security advantages from terrorist attack, 
international supply disruptions, or catastrophic accidents. 
B. Renewable Energ/4 
The discussion of renewable energy policy and resources can 
trace its history to the environmental movement in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. At that time, books such as A Sand County Almanac95 
and Silent Spring95 created popular awareness of threats posed by 
man to our natural environment. Around that time, scientists and 
economists completed an influential empirical study which raised an 
alarm about the irreversible consequences of continued energy 
t · 97 resource consump Ion. 
Those concerns became imbedded in law in the United States 
90. lEA, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION, supra note 86, at 7. 
91. There is also an increase in the number of smart energy providers of 
information and products. See, e.g., Climate Solutions, at 
http://www.climatesolutions.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); Environmental 
Law and Policy Ctr., Smart Energy, at http://www.elpc.org/energy (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2005); Smart-Energy, at http://www.smart-nrg.com (last visited Mar. 
15, 2005); SmartPower, at http://www.smartpower.org (last visited Mar. 15, 
2005). 
92. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 115-17. 
93. JONNES, supra note 31, at 367-70. 
94. See generally, Richard L. Ottinger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable 
Energy Sources for Development, 32 ENVT. L. 331 (2002). 
95. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). 
96. RACHAEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
97. DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). 
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through the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") signed 
into law by President Nixon on January 1, 1970,98 and through 
associated legislation. While NEPA made the country aware of 
environmental issues, the connection between energy and the 
environment did not become part of the policy landscape until the 
passage of President Carter's Energy Security Act of 1980.99 The 
1980 Act promoted the development of alternatives to traditional 
fossil fuels in two ways. First, the government provided financial 
incentives to producers of synthetic fuels, such as oil shale and tar 
sands. Although they were fossil fuel resources, these synthetic 
fuels provided increased independence from foreign oil sources. lOO 
The Act also promoted the development of more environmentally 
benign energy sources, such as bio-mass and alcohol fuels; various 
renewable energy resources; solar energy; conservation; and 
geothermal energy.lOl Even with the impetus of major legislation, 
neither the synfuels industry nor the renewable energy industry 
was able to sustain itself financially. 
The 1970s were a volatile time for our energy economy, 
particularly given the OPEC Oil Embargo of 1973, the latter Iranian 
embargo in 1978, and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in 
1979. Heightened energy awareness began to generate a series of 
studies of our energy future including predictions that would make 
renewable energy a major part of our energy economy.102 In fact, it 
was predicted that solar power would account for twenty percent of 
the electricity generated by the year 2000.103 The year 2000 has 
98. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000). 
99. Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of Titles 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 30, 42, and 50 U.S.C.) 
(1980). The Energy Security Act was comprised of several statutes including: 
the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 617; the United 
States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 633; the Biomass 
Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 683; the Renewable Energy 
Resources Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 715; the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation 
Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 719; and the Geothermal Energy Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 763. 
100. United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
294, 94 Stat. 633. 
101. Geothermal Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 763; Solar Energy 
and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 (1980). 
102. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Energy Policies and Their Consequences After 
25 Years, ENERGY J., Nov. 4, 2003, at 17,17. 
103. Modesto A. Maidique, Solar America, in ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF 
THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, 231, 231 (Robert 
Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin eds., Ballentine Books 1980) (1979); SAM H. SCHURR 
ET AL., ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us 32 (1979) (noting 
that sunlight "carries more potential than any other renewable resource for 
going beyond mere local or regional importance within the United States").; c.r 
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come and past and solar has not moved even a notch on the dial. To 
date, solar power provides about one percent of the nation's 
energy. 1M 
Regardless of the dire predictions, perhaps best captured by the 
book title The End of Nature/os the country is not running out of 
energy/06 nor have we run out of traditional fossil fuels. It is also 
the case that we have not sustained any significant renewable 
energy policy.I07 This is true despite continued calls for a greater 
reliance on renewable resources. lOS What is significantly different 
this time around, however, is that the triple concerns of energy, 
environment, and security are starting to coalesce with energy 
policy thinkers, and renewable energy does playa significant role in 
those new policy discussions. 
When we talk about renewable energy, any number of resources 
can be discussed, including hydro-power, geothermal, bio-mass and 
alcohol fuels, wave power, hydrogen, and the like. Below we discuss 
two particular renewable resources-solar power and wind power-
because both present particular issues for electricity supply. In 
particular, both are attractive because they are decentralized; yet, 
both have two significant problems. First, anyone relying on one of 
these options will want to also have a connection to the grid. Solar 
energy users need the connection as a backup source of energy. 
Those producing electricity using wind turbines need the connection 
to be able to sell the power that they generate. In both cases, the 
need to connect to the grid raises policy issues concerning 
interconnection and pricing. 109 Second, although this is less true for 
FORD FOUND., ENERGY: THE NEXT 20 YEARS 467 (1979) (giving an optimistic view 
of solar energy in the future but noting that it was impossible at that time to 
quantify its likely impact). 
104. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS WITH PRELIMINARY 
DATA FOR 2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar. 
renewableslpageitrendsltrends. pdf. 
105. BILL McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (Penguin Books ed., Viking 1990) 
(1990). 
106. PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL: THE 
TwILIGHT OF FuEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF 
ENERGY, at xv (2005). 
107. Joskow, supra note 102, at 4l. 
108. See DANIEL LASHOF & PATRICIO SILVA, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, A 
RESPONSIBLE ENERGY POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at vi (2001), available at 
http://www .nrdc.orglair/energy/rep/rep. pdf. 
109. See Larry Prete, Transmission Pricing Issues for Electricity Generation 
from Renewable Resources, in RENEWABLE ENERGY 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 45, 
50 (Energy Info. Admin. ed. 1999), available at http://tonto.eia.doe. 
govlFTPROOT/renewablesl062898.pdf (explaining that wind and solar power 
have "lower and more highly variable capacity factors, intermittent availability, 
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wind power, both are not as cost effective as traditionally produced 
electricity.llo These issues must be addressed as we consider the 
design of new energy policy and the reformation of the regulatory 
structure ofthe electric industry. 
1. Solar Power 
There are basically two types of solar energy. First, passive 
solar energy, used principally for water and space heating, is a 
matter of architectural design more than anything else.lll Through 
movable or immovable parts, the sun's heat is captured and stored 
for the purposes listed above. Second, through the use of 
photovoltaic cells and other large solar collectors, electricity can be 
generated and stored.1l2 
As noted earlier, solar power, despite a once promising future,1l3 
now provides almost none of the electricity currently used in the 
United States.114 Government regulation of solar energy to date has 
involved the stimulation of markets through demonstration projects 
and favorable tax rates and credits.115 Nevertheless, the market has 
been static,116 and the industry is yet to be cost competitive.l17 One 
reason may simply be a matter of scale. The largest solar collector 
generates about fifty-five MW of electricity, which can be contrasted 
with a large nuclear coal plant that generates over a thousand MW. 
Nevertheless, given the ubiquity of this power source, one would 
and longer distances for existing transmission lines and/or load centers"). 
110. Suedeen G. Kelly, Alternative Energy Sources, in ENERGY LAw AND 
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 13-1, 13-2 (James E. Hickey et aI. eds., The 
Energy Law Group ed., 2000). 
111. Id. at 13-6. 
112. Id. at 13-3 to -4. 
113. MARK GIELECKI ET AL., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INCENTIVES, MANDATES, 
AND GoVERNMENT PROGRAMS FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGY (2001), 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar.renewableslrea_issueslincent. 
html. . 
114. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text 
115. See, e.g., Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, and 
Demonstration Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5581-5594 (2000); Solar Energy and 
Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 (2000) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.); Solar Energy 
Research Development and Demonstration Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5551-5566 
(2000). According to MIT Professor Paul Joskow, "[iJn the last 25 years there 
has been a plethora of federal policies to encourage alternative fuels and fuel-
use technologies with little to show for the efforts." Joskow, supra note 102, at 
31. 
116. See, e.g, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY ANNUAL 2000, at 11-
14 (2001), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.govIFTPROOT/renewables 
1060300.pdf. 
117. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 13-4. 
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think that we could use the resource better than we do. It has been 
estimated, for example, that "[i]f all the energy from the sun that 
reaches the United States were harnessed ... it would provide about 
500 times the nation's present energy demands.,,1l8 Moreover, not 
only is solar energy safe and inexhaustible, it is not subject to 
cartelization. Therefore, it provides energy security and national 
security as well as providing clean electricity. 
2. Wind Energy 
Wind energy is considered among the fastest growing sources of 
energy today. 119 AB costs decline, wind is attractive because it 
produces no air or water pollution and involves no toxic or 
hazardous waste. It is estimated that wind energy in the United 
States provides enough electricity to serve nearly one million 
households. 120 Wind does, however, present two significant 
environmental issues. The location of wind turbines can be seen as 
aesthetically unattractive, and windmills pose a danger to birds. 
The government currently encourages wind projects through tax 
credits.121 Most of the wind energy is currently generated in 
California, and a joint industry and government organization called 
the National Wind Coordinating Committee has formed to develop a 
commercial market. In 1999, the Secretary of the Department of 
Energy ("DOE") announced a Wind Powering America initiative that 
set a goal of wind energy providing five percent of U.S. electric 
power by 2020.122 
3. Summary 
The United States so far has made very little use of renewable 
energy sources. While there are several forms of renewable energy 
resources, combined they contribute little to the country's overall 
energy needs, satisfying only about two percent of the energy 
supply. 
Nevertheless, given the new demands on energy policy, 
118. Id. at 13-3. 
119. See id. at 13-20 to -22; AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, FAIR TRANSMISSION 
ACCESS FOR WIND: A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PRIORITY ISSUES 1 (2000), available at 
http://www.awea.org/policy/documents/transmission.PDF; Matthew L. Wald, 
Wind Power Is Becoming a Better Bargain: No Fuel Cost or Pollution, but 
Production Is Not Always Reliable, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at A27; DOE, 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: FEMP Focus-Jan./Feb. 2002, at 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/femp/newseventslfempfocus_article.cfmlnews_id= 
7169 (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) [hereinafter DOE, FEMP Focus]. 
120 DOE, FEMP Focus, supra note 119. 
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2000). 
122. AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, supra note 119, at 1. 
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renewable resources are again coming to the fore in policy 
discussions. Such resources are attractive insofar as they are non-
carbon and therefore do not contribute to climate change. They are 
also small-scale, dispersed, and local. Consequently, they go counter 
to the Traditional Model, and they present fewer security risks. 
The troubling aspect of wind power and solar power deals is 
reliability. 123 Because of the vagaries of weather, neither resource 
will be continually producing electricity. Consequently, consumers 
may not be availed of reliable electricity from those sources. More 
problematic is that connections to the grid124 become difficult and 
may even pose threats to wind turbines. These issues will have to 
be resolved if we are to increase our reliance on renewable sources of 
energy. 
At the moment, however, the huge stumbling block is that many 
renewable resources are not close to being cost competitive with 
fossil fuels. Still, their attractions are considerable, and they are 
part of contemporary energy thought.125 
c. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
According to the federal government, a renewable portfolio 
standard ("RPS") is a "market-based strategy to ensure that 
renewable energy constitutes a certain percentage of total energy 
generation or consumption."126 The government creates a RPS when 
it requires electricity generators or sellers to supply a percentage of 
their electricity generation or sales with electricity from renewable 
resources or technologies. Although there are no federal RPS 
programs to date,127 they are operating in various states. As of 2004, 
eighteen states had programs in place.128 
Acknowledging that the renewable resources are often not cost 
123. Lovins argues to the contrary, however, that reliability is less of a 
problem than the critics make it. LoVINS, supra note 65, § 2.5, at 44-45. 
124. See FERC, Interconnection for Wind Energy and Other Alternative 
Technologies, 70 Fed. Reg. 4791, 4793-94 (proposed Jan. 24, 2005) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
125. See CAP, SECURING ENERGY FuTuRE, supra note 65, at 12; EFC, 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 16; NCEP, STALEMATE, supra 
note 65, at 62. 
126. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
RESTRUCTURING FOR FuEL SUPPLIERS 73 (1998), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/electricity/chg_str3uel.pdf. 
127. There is, however, a federal RPS proposal that would require 5.5% of 
electricity to be generated from renewable sources by 2010. Sellers would be 
able to meet the RPS requirement either by generating renewable electricity 
themselves or by purchasing tradable renewable electricity credits. Id.; see also 
Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (June 3, 1999). 
128. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 104, at 3. 
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competitive with traditional resources does not end consideration of 
them in our energy future. Rather, the question becomes how to 
encourage the development and deployment of smaller, cleaner 
renewable energy resources and technologies. A standard 
regulatory response is through subsidies, financial incentives, 
standards, and other regulatory devices.129 State governments have 
developed a different response through standard setting. In 
particular, several state governments now require that electricity 
producers must provide specified percentages of generation from 
renewable energy sources by specified dates. As examples, 
California has set a target portfolio requirement of twenty percent 
by 2017, and Maine set a thirty percent goal to be achieved by 
2000. 130 Hydroelectricity, however, is included in Maine's definition 
of renewable resources. Often, RPS programs include a trading 
provision through which regulated firms can trade renewable energy 
credits, thus creating a market like the emissions trading market. 
This market gives producers more flexibility in meeting the 
standards imposed upon them because a generator that cannot meet 
its requirement can purchase credits, while generators that can 
exceed the goal will sell credits. 
RPS programs can be designed such as to encourage the 
development and use of particular technologies. Nevada, for 
example, encourages the use of photovoltaic cells by giving literally 
extra credits for electricity produced by those cells.131 
D. Smart Electricity Grids 
Each of the previous smart energy activities depends on a 
reliable distribution system, and the grid is in need of improvement 
as attested to by the August 2003 Blackout.132 New technologies, 
under the rubric "Smart Grid," promise to improve the grid and 
enable it to move electricity more efficiently and more effectively. 
The Smart Grid promises "important economic, security, and 
environmental benefits by promoting substantial upgrades to the 
performance of the transmission and distribution network that 
129. See Mark Gielecki et al., Incentives, Mandates, and Government 
Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy, in ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 2000: ISSUES AND TRENDS 1-17 (2001), available at 
http://www .eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar .renewableslrea_issuesl062800. pdf. 
130. See Everett Britt, Renewable Electric Generation 2004: Incentives, 
Obligations, and Concerns, NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV'T, Winter 2005, at 34, 35. 
131. Id. at 35. 
132. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON 
THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at https://reports.energy.govlBlackout 
Final-Web.pdf. 
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connects electricity generators and consumers.,,133 Contemporary 
thinking, then, integrates energy, environment, and security into 
the distribution and transmission system by incorporating 
"sophisticated sensing and monitoring technology, information 
technology, and communications to provide better grid performance 
and to support a wide array of additional services to consumers.,,134 
There is a general consensus that investment in the electricity 
infrastructure is lagging behind our electricity needs135 and that 
additional, more reliable, transmission and distribution capacity is 
necessary. Given the need for a system upgrade, there is no reason 
not to improve upon the technology while simultaneously addressing 
environmental and security needs. Such improvements can occur 
through the so-called Smart Grid that involves: 
• Infrastructure with "smarter" controls to support robust 
market activity; rapid recovery from cascading outages, 
natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks;136 
133. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 75. 
134. [d.; see also ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGY 
ROADMAP: MEETING THE CRITICAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21sT CENTURY: 2003 
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 1-4 (2003) [hereinafter ELEC. POWER RES. INST., 
ROADMAP], available at http://www.epri.com/roadmap/viewpdfs.asp. The 
Electric Power Research Institute claims: 
[aJ truly "smart" power delivery system will include automated 
capabilities to anticipate problems, find solutions, and optimize 
performance ... The basic building blocks include advanced sensors for 
wide-area system monitoring and control, faster-than-real-time data 
processing and pattern recognition software, solid-state power flow 
controllers, and two-way energy/information consumer access portals. 
[d.; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON ENERGY POLICY, REVIVING THE ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY 4-5, 8 
(2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdflenvironment_energy_ 
policy_0903.pdf. 
135. ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 1-1; Kueck, supra 
note 84, at 48; Joskow, supra note 102, at 23; EFC, CHALLENGE AND 
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 76; ERIC HIRST, EDISON ELEC. INST., U.S. 
TRANSMISSION CAPACITY: PRESENT STATUS AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.eei.orglindustry _issues/energy_infrastructure! 
transmissionlUSTransCapacity10-18-04.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 25 (2002), available at http://www.eh.doe. 
gov/ntgs/gridstudy /main_print.pdf; see also PAUL J. HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GROUP, 
INC., U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: DEMAND, SUPPLY AND FACILITY SITING: 
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY 2 (2004), available at 
http://64.70. 252.93/082F4698.pdf. 
136. This capacity is also know as a "self-healing" grid. "A self-healing grid 
integrates real-time information from embedded sensors with distributed 
intelligence and automated control, enabling the system to respond 
automatically to disruptive events and attacks to the system." EFC, 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 77. 
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• High quality and highly reliable electricity for our digital 
economy; 
• An infrastructure connected with advanced communications 
to form an energy web; 
• An energy web which increases economic productivity; 
• "Clean... power generation technologies" and "universal 
access to affordable electricity.,,137 
Smart Grid technologies are attractive not only because they 
are responsive to the increasing environmental sensitivity of 
progressive electricity policies but also because they increase grid 
security and contribute to greater demand sensitivities. Security is 
heightened as the grid operates more rapidly to recognize and 
isolate problem areas. The Smart Grid will also be one that can 
easily accommodate distributed and small-scale generation 
technologies, which, by their size alone, make less attractive targets. 
The Smart Grid is intended to be consumer friendly in other ways as 
well by providing communications and power to "smart" buildings to 
make the most intelligent use of equipment.13B Such portals enable 
residential, commercial and industrial customers to "manage 
electricity use in a manner that improves efficiency and reduces 
consumer energy costs, while at the same time enhancing customer 
control of electrical equipment."139 In the next sub-part, we address 
electricity pricing and the Smart Grid together with smart metering. 
Together these technologies facilitate real-time pricing thus giving 
consumers more accurate price signals. 
To be sure, the Smart Grid is a matter of our electricity future, 
not a current reality. To become a reality certain recommendations 
have been made including: 
• The DOE should be charged with establishing a clear vision 
and set of goals for the development of the Smart Grid 
through a program of regional and local demonstrations 
projects. 
137. ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 2-2; see EFC, 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 78-79; NCEP, STALEMATE, 
supra note 65, at 94. 
138. "The GridWise Alliance is a consortium of public and private 
stakeholders," whose mission it is to "provide real-world technology solutions to 
support the U.S. Department of Energy's vision of a transformed national 
electric system." See Gridwise Alliance, The Gridwise Alliance, at 
http://www.gridwise.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). The alliance 
envisions an electric system that will "employ new distributed 'plug and play' 
technologies using advanced telecommunications, information and control 
approaches to create a society of devices that functions as an integrated 
trans active system." [d. 
139. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 78. 
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• Appropriate technical and reliability standards must be 
devised and adopted (the North American Electric Reliability 
Council can be tasked with this recommendation). 
• A Twenty-First Century Electricity System Security and 
Modernization Fund should be created to fund the necessary 
investment in research and development. 14o 
To the end of modernizing the electric grid, the DOE has 
announced its support of technological innovations in transmission, 
communications and information, and siting. 141 The DOE proposes a 
National Electric Delivery Technologies Roadmap/42 which will be a 
combined government and industry undertaking to improve 
electricity transmission. 
v. THE SMART CONSUMPTION MODEL 
A smart electricity generation policy will not displace the 
Traditional Model. It is, however, responsive to protecting the 
environment and serving other important national interests. The 
evaluative test for the success of the smart generation alternatives 
will come in the market, and, for this reason as well as others, the 
market must contain a pricing mechanism that is cost sensitive. We 
therefore turn next to new thinking about electricity pricing. 
More specifically, this section investigates the potential of 
marginal cost pricing to promote energy conservation. Our analysis 
reveals that marginal cost pricing requires the installation of new 
meters that should result in significant energy conservation, which 
in turn will reduce some of the environment harm associated with 
electricity generation, and that the benefits of reduced consumption 
should outweigh the problems of achieving it. 
A. Meters and Prices 
Most retail consumers purchase electricity according to how 
much electricity they consume over some period of time, usually a 
month. 143 The price usually does not vary, except possibly for fuel 
costs,l44 even if the cost of producing the electricity goes up because 
140. These last three recommendations are those of the Energy Future 
Coalition. [d. at 80-84. 
141. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, "GRID 2030": A NATIONAL VISION FOR 
ELECTRICITY'S SECOND 100 YEARS 27-28 (2003), available at 
http://www.electricity.doe.gov/documentslElectric_ Vision_Document. pdf; see 
also Michael T. Burr, The Digitized Grid: Data Gathering and Controllability 
Offer the Quickest Path to Reliability, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2005, at 26,27. 
142. See, e.g., ELEC. POWER RES. lNST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at vii. 
143. Moot, supra note 4, at 315. 
144. See, e.g, MIDAMERICAN ENERGY CO., SCHEDULE OF RATES FOR ELECTRIC 
SERVICE IN ILLINOIS, RIDER No.2 ELECTRIC FuEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE 17 (1995), 
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retail prices are based on the average cost of producing and 
delivering electricity. By comparison, electricity production costs 
vary significantly by hour in almost all systems across the 
country. 145 
Average cost pricing is used in large part because marginal cost 
pricing requires the use of meters that measure the time of day that 
electricity is consumed.146 If electricity prices are based on marginal 
costs, consumers will have an incentive to reduce electricity use 
during periods of peak demand or to switch to less expensive sources 
of energy because the cost of generating and delivering electricity is 
normally greater during such peaks.147 There is little marginal cost 
pricing in both regulated and unregulated generation markets 
because neither market generally employs meters that measure 
time-of-day demand. 148 
1. Regulated Markets 
Consumers do not pay any more for electricity when the costs of 
generating and delivering it increase in regulated markets (except 
for fuel costs) because the normal method of setting utility prices 
uses average cost. Regulators, however, could adopt marginal cost 
pricing if they required utilities to install time-of-use meters. 
a. Traditional Regulation. Under cost-of-service ratemaking, 
regulators first determine the revenue requirement of a utility.149 
Regulators calculate the revenue requirement by estimating the cost 
of producing electricity and how much money the utility must earn 
to provide a sufficient rate of return for stockholders and 
bondholders who invest in the company. 150 Once the revenue 
requirement is determined, regulators determine the price that the 
utility can charge for each unit of electricity. Regulators can do this 
by dividing the revenue requirement by the quantity of electricity 
that they estimate the utility will sell, but regulators may also make 
adjustments to reflect differences in the cost of producing and 
transmitting electricity. 151 For example, a commission will set a 
lower price for large industrial users because it is less expensive for 
a utility to deliver a large volume of electricity to one location than 
available at http://www.midamericanenergy.com/pdflrateslelecrates/ilelectriC/ 
17-17.30.pdf. 
145. See David Nichols & John Stutz, Load Response: New, or Deja Vu?, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2001, at 73, 74. 
146. Moot, supra note 4, at 315. 
147. See infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text. 
148. Moot, supra note 4, at 315. 
149. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 109. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 113. 
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much smaller amounts to thousands of households. None of these 
prices reflect actual marginal costs since they are based on 
regulators' estimates of the differences in cost of providing service to 
different classes of customers. More importantly, once a price is 
established for a class of customers, it does not change over the 
period of time in which it is in effect.152 In other words, price is the 
average cost of producing electricity for that class of customers. 
Thus, even after these adjustments, other than the actual fIxed price 
paid, there is no further incentive for any class of consumers under 
this regulatory system to use less electricity when the cost of 
producing it rises. 
The current method of structuring prices does not take into 
account that the cost of producing electricity normally increases 
during periods of peak demand. The cost goes up for several 
reasons. During periods of peak demand, electrical utilities 
typically include older, more inefficient generation plants in their 
portfolio of generators, which are not normally used because they 
are more expensive to operate and because they cause more air 
pollution than other generation units. l53 In restructured electricity 
markets, local utilities can purchase additional supplies of 
electricity from other generators, but the cost of electricity 
purchased from other suppliers can be expected to rise as demand 
increases unless there is sufficient excess efficient generation. 
Furthermore, the marginal transportation costs rise according to the 
distance over which electricity is transported because megawatts 
are lost in the act of transmitting electricity.154 In addition, the cost 
of transmission increases because high demand for electricity 
creates transmission congestion.155 
The cost differences between peak and non-peak demand can be 
substantial as the following table illustrates: 
152. John C. Hilke, A Consumer Self-Defense Perspective on Electricity 
Markets, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 808-09 (2002). 
153. Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why 
Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law 
Fails to Protect Us Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its 
Use), 83 OR. L. REV. 207, 236-38 (2004). 
154. Moot, supra note 4, at 315. 
155. Id. at 314. 
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TYPICAL COSTS OF POWER: COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
USERS, DOLLARS PER MEGAWATT-HOUR ("MWH,,)156 
Average Highest Off-Peak 1,000 to Cost 2,000 Hours 
Generation 30-50 20 100-160 
Distribution 20-40 10 40-60 
Total $50-90 $30 $140-220 
531 
b. Regulatory Reform. If regulators decided to employ marginal 
cost pricing, there are a number of difficult issues that they will 
have to overcome. These include the choice of a pricing method, the 
scope of the marginal cost pricing, and methods to protect 
consumers who still purchase electricity from monopoly suppliers. 
i. Pricing Method. Regulators have two general options to 
adopt marginal cost pricing: consumers receive rebates for reducing 
electricity usage during periods of peak demand or retail prices are 
actually based on the marginal cost of producing electricity. 
a. Rebates. Under this approach, consumers are rewarded 
for reducing electricity use during periods of high demand. Thus, in 
this approach, consumers reduce their electricity loads in response 
to actual or forecasted demand.157 In return, they are entitled to 
rebates based on the amount that they reduce their electricity use 
during these periods of high demand. For example, a consumer 
might receive fifty percent of the amount of money a utility saves 
because the consumer reduced its electricity use during a period of 
high demand. The utility saves money because it does not have to 
generate (or buy) electricity for that customer at a time when the 
cost of producing the electricity (or buying it) has increased. 
Ai:, compared to marginal cost pricing, this approach creates less 
incentive for consumers to reduce their electricity use because 
consumers capture only some percentage of the amount of money 
that the utility saves because it does not have to pay higher 
marginal costs to generate and deliver electricity. If, by comparison, 
marginal cost pricing is used, the consumer can save the full amount 
of the increase in cost. For example, if the marginal cost of 
producing electricity during a period of high demand is 50¢ per 
156. This table is from Tobey Winters, Retail Electricity Markets Require 
Marginal Cost Real-Time Pricing, ELECTRICITY. J., Nov. 2001, at 74, 76; see also 
Moot, supra note 4, at 315 (finding that marginal cost of producing electricity on 
a hot summer day can be $501MWh as compared to $201MWh on a cool day). 
157. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 56. 
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kilowatt ("kW") and the consumer is entitled to fifty percent of that 
amount, the consumer is entitled to a 25¢ rebate per kW. If, 
however, the consumer will have to pay the entire 50¢ per kW for 
any electricity used during a peak period, the consumer can save 
50¢ for each kW that electricity usage is reduced or deferred to a 
period when prices are lower. Marginal cost pricing therefore 
provides more incentive for consumer to engage in conservation 
efforts. Nevertheless, this plan may be attractive to regulators 
because it protects consumers from a run-up in prices during periods 
of peak demand while still providing an incentive for consumers to 
reduce their electricity usage. 158 
b. Variable prices. Regulators can also pursue marginal 
cost pricing through use of "time-of-use" or "real-time" pricing. In 
time-of-use pricing, meters record when consumption occurs (for 
example, hourly), and rates are assigned to time blocks much like 
monthly rates are presently assigned.159 For example, Florida Gulf 
Power normally charges customers three different rates (low cost, 
medium, and high cost) depending when the electricity is used.160 
Real-time pricing, in contrast, uses an even smarter meter than the 
time-of-use meter to communicate the actual price of electricity in 
real time.161 
The biggest advantage of time-of-use pricing is that it is easier 
for consumers to understand and therefore for utilities and their 
regulators to embrace. Nevertheless, the incremental benefits of 
real-time pricing over time-of-use pricing may be significant relative 
to the small incremental cost of a real time meter over a time-of-use 
meter. Unlike real-time pricing, time-of-use pricing does not 
distinguish between hot days and cool days because the rate for 
blocks of time is set in advance. In addition, a key issue is how 
consumers will react to each type of pricing. Assuming that the 
time periods are designed such that the average customer consumes 
half of his demand during peak hours at 1O¢ per kilowatt-hour 
("kWh") and half during off-peak hours at 4¢ per kWh, consumers 
may behave as if they are charged 7¢ per kWh regardless of when 
power is consumed. By comparison, real time pricing seems more 
likely to cause consumers to engage in conservation efforts since 
158. See id. 
159. Wolfgang Orasch et aI., Efficient Load-Management Tools in 
Competitive Electricity Markets: Time-Of-Use Rates and Real-Time-Pricing, 
Presented at the Conference on Domestic Use of Energy, Cape Technikon, Cape 
Town (1998), available at http://www.ctech.ac.za/confldue/SOURCElWeb/ 
OraschlOrasch. htmI. 
160. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 56. 
161. [d. 
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they are immediately aware of the costs of not doing so. 
Nevertheless, some critics claim real-time pricing will not work 
unless consumers have smart devices that shut off appliances when 
electricity costs rise or reduce the amount of electricity that they 
use.
162 There are, however, a number of studies that indicate 
residential and small business consumers are able to shift their 
electricity demand in response to prices that vary by time. 163 
Moreover, consumer response can be enhanced if utilities and 
regulators alert consumers to potential price increases. This would' 
be similar to efforts to inform people about the quality of air during , 
periods of potentially unhealthy smog. Most morning newspapers 
and television broadcasts convey this information to consumers. 
Similarly, the news media can warn consumers about weather 
conditions that will result in high demand for electricity and 
therefore higher electrical prices. Regulators could require utilities 
to maintain websites that indicate current prices, or even send email 
alerts, which may make it easier for consumers to keep abreast of 
changes in price. 
The adoption of real-time pricing would also create a market 
demand for devices to assist consumers in reducing their energy 
costs. Utilizing a Smart Grid, as discussed earlier/64 real-time 
pricing meters can be designed to give consumers immediate 
information on the rate of consumption and the current cost per 
hour.16s It will also be possible to automate some consumer 
responses. For example, the meter can be connected to "smart" 
appliances that shut off or cut back on electricity use when they 
receive a signal of higher prices.166 
ii. Consumer Protection. When marginal cost pricing is used in 
monopoly electricity markets, regulation of prices will remain 
necessary to protect consumer interests. Regulators face three 
general challenges. 
First, regulators will have to use ratemaking to establish a 
revenue requirement for a utility's costs other than the cost of 
producing electricity. The retail price would be composed of the 
marginal cost of producing and delivering the electricity plus the 
price set by regulators to permit the utility to recoup its other costs. 
162. See Lisa Kosavanic & Dan Engel, Meeting the Nation's Demand for 
Power: A New Take on Demand Programs, ENERGY USER NEWS, May 2004, at 
11,12. 
163. Borenstein et aI., supra note 5, at 28. 
164. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. 
165. See Chris King & Dan Delurey, Efficiency & Demand Response: Twins, 
Siblings, or Cousins?, 54 PuB. UTIL. FORT., March 2005, at 54,56. 
166. See Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12 (discussing "smart" 
appliances). 
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Regulators would also need to verifY that the marginal costs a utility 
charged were its actual marginal costs. For this purpose, regulators 
would need to establish in advance how marginal costs were to be 
calculated. 
Second, regulators will have to address the problem that 
marginal cost pricing creates economic risks for consumers that did 
not exist previously because retail rates will vary, sometimes by 
substantial amounts.167 Economic theory would dictate that prices 
should be based on marginal costs regardless of volatility, but this 
result may not be consistent with a regulator's legal obligation to 
design regulation in a manner that protects the public. Moreover, 
the adoption of marginal cost pricing may not be politically feasible 
if consumers are exposed to price spikes and market volatility.l66 At 
the same time, efforts to protect consumers against price spikes will 
reduce the extent to which marginal cost pricing creates an 
incentive to engage in conservation. 
Regulators have a number of options to address this issue. 
They can make marginal cost pricing voluntary. Or, as noted 
earlier, they can adopt a rebate plan.169 Under this approach, 
consumers are protected against price spikes because they pay 
regulated rates for electricity. At the same time, they receive 
rebates for reducing the electricity load during peak periods, which 
encourages conservation or deferral. Regulators can also adopt a 
price ban that limits the amount that prices can be increased or 
decreased based on the marginal cost of producing the electricity, 
protecting consumers and utility investors. Whichever approach is 
adopted, regulators ought to make the ultimate objective to move as 
many consumers as politically and legally possible to marginal cost 
pricing. . 
Finally, regulators will need to consider the potential burden on 
low-income electrical consumers, who will be less able to afford to 
install energy saving products, such as better insulation, as 
compared to wealthier consumers. More accurately, these 
consumers would not be in a position to pay higher rents for housing 
if landlords took additional conservation measures and passed the 
costs on to their tenants. This reality suggests that low-income 
consumers will end up paying higher electrical bills. However, 
because low-income consumers generally live in small housing units, 
the amount of the increase may not be very great. Moreover, low-
income consumers can avoid higher prices to the extent that they 
167. Phil Hanser et aI., Real-Time Pricing-Restructuring's Big Bang?, PuB. 
UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1997, at 22, 28. 
168. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12. 
169. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text 
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535 2005
2005] RETHINKING REFORM 535 
conserve electricity during periods of high demand. Nevertheless, 
even a small increase in price may be highly detrimental to low-
income consumers. Some low-income consumers may not be able to 
reduce electrical use because, for example, they are unable to work 
and, therefore, are not in a position to conserve on air conditioning 
during the middle of the day, as compared to persons who leave for 
work. 
There are a number of potential solutions to this problem. 
Regulators could exempt low-income consumers from installing 
more expensive meters, low-income consumers could be entitled to 
purchase electricity at lower rates, or they could receive a discount 
when they paid their bills. All of these methods, however, would 
require a subsidy from either other ratepayers, which could be part 
of the regulated portion of the price that utilities would charge, or 
taxpayers in the form of direct subsidies. Since welfare reform 
seems unlikely, regulators should attempt to address the issue of 
low-income consumers during regulatory reform. 
2. Unregulated Markets 
In competitive markets, sellers will continue to sell a product or 
service as its marginal revenue exceeds its marginal costs. l7O Thus, 
short-run prices in competitive markets reflect marginal costs. l7l In 
competitive generation markets for electricity, however, sellers 
cannot always charge consumers for electricity according to the time 
of day that electricity is produced. As in regulated markets, many 
consumers still have meters that measure only the total electricity 
consumed, but not the time during which it was consumed.172 
As a result, the market price does not fully reflect the marginal 
cost of producing electricity for consumers who lack new meters. 
Instead, they purchase electricity at a fixed price for some period of 
time, such as one month. A utility will calculate this fixed price 
based on an estimate of its average marginal costs for that month. 
While this approach is closer to marginal cost pricing than occurs 
under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking, it still does not reflect 
changes in the cost of producing electricity at different times of day 
or on different days within the billing period. 
B. Prices and Conservation 
Economic theory predicts that consumer demand will fall as the 
price of a product or service goes up. Thus, if consumers pay higher 
prices for electricity during periods of higher demand, the demand 
170. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 49. 
171. Id. at 48. 
172. See supra notes 52 ,143-48 and accompanying text 
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for electricity should fall. This "economic law," however, is subject 
to some important caveats. The extent to which consumers will 
reduce demand depends on the elasticity of demand. If consumers 
do not have a readily available substitute for a product or service, 
demand will not fall as rapidly as when less expensive substitutes 
are available.173 Consumers have three potential substitutes for 
purchasing electricity: They can reduce demand during peak periods 
when prices are higher, invest in products that reduce energy use, or 
switch to lower cost sources of energy. According to economic 
theory, consumers will choose these options only if they cost less 
than paying for more electricity, and the consumer will choose 
among these options based on their comparative costs. 
While all three of these options will reduce the demand for 
electricity, the last may not produce an environmental improvement 
if consumers switch to an alternative source of energy that creates 
as much or more pollution.174 For example, some consumers may 
switch to a diesel unit that produces pollution emissions that greatly 
exceed those produced by the plant whose electricity the consumer is 
replacing.175 Most households, however, are unlikely to keep a 
generator in the backyard, and most industrial users will likely rely 
on less expensive sources of energy, such as natural gas, to fuel self-
generation. 
Since marginal cost pricing is not widely used, there is only 
limited evidence concerning the extent to which consumers will 
reduce demand in response to higher prices. The results of 
voluntary programs, however, suggest that it will be possible to 
obtain significant reductions of demand during periods of peak 
usage. A program offered to industrial users by the Georgia Power 
Company, for example, has produced as much as a 500 MW 
reduction in the utility's load, which represents about ten percent of 
the utility's total industrial demand.176 When the utility charges its 
highest prices, it gets an eighteen percent reduction in demand. l77 
Similarly, a voluntary program for industrial users in New York 
173. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 49. 
174. Nichols & Stutz, supra note 145, at 77. 
175. Id. 
176. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12. The company offers 
industrial users a two-part fee composed of standard rates for a baseline level of 
consumption and hourly market-based rates for consumption above the baseline 
amount. Firms can also receive a credit (at market rates) for reducing 
consumption below the baseline amount. Id. 
177. John Wilson et aI., USING DEMAND RESPONSIVE LOADS TO MEET 
CALIFORNIA'S RELIABILITY NEEDS 8, available at http://www.westgov.org/ 
wieb/electricJdemand%20response/background%20documents/wilson_paper. pdf 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005). 
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took an average of 668 MW in load off the grid during the hottest 
summer days, which is the equivalent of the generating capacity of a 
large turbine power plant.178 
There have also been positive results concerning residential 
consumers. Residential consumers who volunteered for a variable 
rate program offered by Gulf Power in Florida consumed only 20% of 
the power they purchased during high-cost periods, producing an 
annual average 14% savings in their electricity bills.179 An 
experimental plan in California that used marginal cost pricing 
including a very high price for critical peak periods resulted in a 
reduction of over 12% in peak demand.180 A marginal price plan that 
did not include a critical rate produced a 4% decrease in demand 
during peak periods.181 Prices during the peak period were about 
three times higher under the plan with the higher prices.182 
These results suggest that at least some industrial and 
residential consumers will reduce demand in response to price 
increases or rebates. The critical issue is how many consumers are 
sensitive to price and how they will act when prices go up (or when 
there is an opportunity to earn a rebate). Some commentators 
predict that many residential consumers will not react to high prices 
by reducing electrical use during peak periods of demand, at least in 
the short run.183 This will happen if the purchase of more energy-
efficient appliances or of more insulation costs more than paying 
higher electricity bills, which may be the situation for persons who 
do not consume much electricity, even during periods of peak 
demand. Since, however, the benefits of lower demand are benefits 
for everyone using electricity, these commentators argue regulators 
may be justified in using additional financial incentives to 
178. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 55. 
179. [d. at 58. Under the program, Gulf Power customers pay four different 
rates (low, medium, high, and extraordinary) for electricity depending on when 
it is used. [d. 
180. CHARLES RIVER Assocs., STATEWIDE PRICING PILOT SUMMER 2003 IMPACT 
ANALYSIS 7, 9 (2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/demandresponse! 
documents/group3_final_reportS/2004-10-29_SPP _REPORT.PDF. Under this 
plan, demand increased 3% during non-peak hours as consumers shifted their 
use from expensive peak power to less expensive off-peak power. [d. The total 
demand for peak periods was decreased by 1.4%. [d. at 8 tbl.1-3. 
181. [d. at 9-10. Total demand for peak periods under this plan had an 
increase of 0.1%. [d. at 10. 
182. [d. at 2. 
183. Nichols & Stutz, supra note 145, at 77-78; see also Fereidoon Sioshansi 
& Ali Vojdani, What Could Possibly Be Better Than Real-Time Pricing? Demand 
Response, ELECTRICITY J., June 2001, at 39, 40 (observing that "[m]ost 
consumers are totally oblivious to the actual costs they impose on the system as 
they use power"). 
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encourage conservation. This argument anticipates that the cost of 
the incentives will be substantially less than the benefits of 
protecting the environment and having a more reliable and less 
expensive generation and delivery system.l84 Fifteen states 
currently have established benefit funds for this purpose funded by 
a small charge of all kWh flowing through the transmission and 
distribution grids. ls5 
C. Capital Costs 
There are good reasons to believe that marginal cost pricing (or 
some variation of it) will lead to conservation efforts by at least some 
consumers. Marginal cost pricing will cause consumers to use less 
electricity during periods of high demand and, to the extent that 
such use cannot be rescheduled to periods of lower cost, to purchase 
energy saving products. Nevertheless, for this reform to succeed, 
regulators will need to require utilities to install new meters in 
millions of homes and small businesses. Although this is by no 
means an inexpensive proposition, it does appear to be cost-effective. 
There is limited information about the cost of real time meters. 
However, the utility in Ontario, Canada is contemplating installing 
meters and estimates the cost to be C$150 to C$450 per meter 
initially, decreasing to C$150 (about US$120 to US $362).186 As the 
number of meters in use increases, the cost of meters should decline 
over time. There were 116 million residential customers and an 
additional fifteen million commercial customers in the United States 
in 2002. 187 Conservatively assuming a cost of $200 per meter for 130 
million residential and commercial consumers, the total installation 
cost would be about $26 billion. The cost could be lower or higher if 
meter costs were more or less than $200 each.ls8 
184. At an earlier point in time, utilities funded programs to encourage more 
efficient energy use and to assist low-income consumers with home 
weatherization, among other expenditures. Steven Nadel, Smart Energy 
Policies Through Greater Energy Efficiency, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 226, 
227 (2002). The value of energy savings gained by consumers was about double 
the cost of producing the savings. [d. at 228. 
185. [d. 
186. Ontario Ponders Smart v. Not So Smart, THE ELECTRICITY DAILY, Nov. 
3,2004. 
187. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2002, at 6 tbl.ES (2003), 
available at http://tonto.eia.doe.govIFTPROOT/electricity/034802.pdf. 
188. The 2,000 meters installed in the California SPP cost an average of 
$5,000 to install according to The Utility Reform Network ("TURN"). Marcel 
Hawiger & Jeff Nahigian, Letters to the Editor, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 2003, 
at 10,10. A high cost-per-meter in a pilot is not indicative, however, of the cost 
that will be experienced in a wide-scale rollout. Nevertheless, we are cognizant 
of TURN's admonition to consider the impact on the smaller consumers before 
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 539 2005
2005] RETHINKING REFORM 539 
The actual total cost, however, would be less since it would be 
offset by the amount of money that consumers would save by 
decreasing peak purchases in favor of cheaper power during non-
peak periods. While it is difficult to estimate how much money 
people will save, rudimentary calculations suggest consumers 
should quickly recoup the cost of the new meter. For a ballpark 
estimate, assume that the capital markets require a 10% internal 
rate of return on the investment in metering over a ten year period. 
Annual savings of about $4 billion per year would be necessary to 
generate such a return on investment. Since residential consumers 
spent over $100 billion on power in 2002,189 a 4% reduction in energy 
costs would be sufficient to amortize the investment in metering. 
An alternative analysis is to consider the average customer. 
According to the study commissioned by the DOE, the average 
residential customer in 2002 consumed about 10,880 kWh per year 
at an average cost of 8.46¢ per kWh, or a total of $920 for the year .190 
The California time-of-day pricing tariff deemed 1,500 hours per 
year to be "peak" periods and 7,260 hours per year to be "off-peak" 
and assigned prices to the peak periods that were 153% higher than 
off-peak prices.191 If the California parameters are applied to the 
DOE data, there is a peak price of 16.960¢ per kWh and off-peak 
price of 6.704¢ per kWh.192 Assuming a meter cost of $200, an 
annual savings of about $32.50 would be required to amortize the 
cost of the meter.193 To generate $32.50 in savings, about 316 kWh 
of consumption (about 3% of the annual consumption of the average 
residential consumer) would have to be switched from peak prices to 
off-peak prices. 
This analysis suggests that large electricity consumers should 
be able to recoup the cost of the meters without much difficulty. For 
example, the Marriott Hotel in New York saved more than $200,000 
in the first summer of experimental testing of Consolidated Edison's 
real time pricing by reducing its use of energy during peak periods 
installing a meter that will never be paid out. See supra notes 143-48 and 
accompanying text. 
189. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 7 tbl.ES. 
190. [d. at 6-7 tbl.ES. (demonstrating that retail sales of 1,266,959,000 
MWh to 116,448,000 residential customers in 2002, or approximately 10,880 
kWh per customer). 
191. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, STATEWIDE PRICING PILOT (SPP): OVERVIEW AND 
DESIGN FEATURES 7 (2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/demand 
response/documentS/2004-09-30_workshop/2004-09-30_SPP _ OVERVIEW. PDF. 
192. The weighted average of 16.960¢ per kWh for 1,500 hours and 6.704¢ 
per kWh for 7,260 hours equals the 8.46¢ per kWh in the EIA data. 
193. A $32.50 annual savings for ten years has a present value of $200 using 
a 10% discount rate. 
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of demand.194 The experience of residential consumers, however, 
indicates that they also will be able to recoup the cost of a new 
meter through decreased demand or shifts in the use of electricity. 
Customers of Gulf Power in Florida who purchased electricity under 
a voluntary variable rate plan saved, on average, 14% on their 
annual electricity costS.195 
There are additional savings. Capital costs will be saved as 
peak day loads grow less rapidly than total demand due to 
consumption switching away from peak periods. It is difficult to 
know how much money will be saved by additional conservation by 
consumers, but the United States is facing a very large bill for 
construction of new generation and transmission facilities in the 
next decade. A study commissioned by Edison Electric Institute 
estimates that $56 billion of transmission investments will be 
required during the current decade.196 The Energy Information 
Agency, an arm of the U.S. DOE, estimates that 88 gigawatts ("gW") 
of generation will be required by the year 2010.197 Using industry 
rules of thumb, 88 gW of capacity would require an investment of 
between $26 billion 198 and $44 billion.199 
Moreover, the potential to save money is substantial because 
this household use of electricity in the residential segment is the 
largest consumer of power,200 and more importantly, it has the 
194. Hanser et aI., supra note 167, at 26. 
195. Thomas et al., supra note 3, at 56. For details of the program, see 
supra notes 157 , 179 and accompanying text 
196. See ERIC HIRST & BRENDAN KIRBY, EDISON ELEc. INST., TRANSMISSION 
PLANNING FOR A RESTRUCTURING U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 9 (2001), available 
at http://www.eei.orglindustry _issues/energy _infrastructure/transmission! 
transmission_hirst.pdf. But see Steve Huntoon & Alexandra Metzner, The Myth 
of the Transmission Deficit, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 1, 2003, at 28, 30 (arguing 
that transmission investment needs are overstated and that the actual 
investment requirement is $56 billion over the next ten years-$35 billion of 
which utilities already plan to spend). 
197. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNuAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2025, at 81 (2004), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov 
/oiaflarchive/aeo04lpdfl0383(2004).pdf. 
198. Based upon a rule of thumb of $300 per kW of capacity. Edward N. 
Krapels, What Is a Power Plant Worth?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2004, at 31, 31 
(misstating the capital cost rule of thumb in terms of "per-megawatt" rather 
than kW, but having calculations consistent with $300 per kW). 
199. Based upon a rule of thumb of $500 per kW. HIRST & KIRBY, supra note 
196, at 10. 
200. The EIA breaks down power demand into four segments: residential 
(1,267 million megawatt hours ("MM MWh") of consumption in 2002); 
commercial (1,116 MM MWh); industrial (972 MM MWh); and other (107 MM 
MWh). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 4. 
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lowest load factor of the three major market segments.201 The 
residential segment accounts for about 37% of annual electricity 
consumption, while the commercial and industrial segments 
represent 32% and 28%, respectively, of demand.202 The amount of 
electricity consumed, however, understates the true burden that the 
residential segment places on the power grid. Since power cannot be 
stored, each utility must have the ability to generate or purchase 
enough power to meet peak day demand; therefore, peak usage is a 
better indicator of the demand that a segment makes upon the 
power grid. Assuming 40%, 60%, and 80% load factors for 
residential, commercial, and industrial consumers, respectively, 
residential consumers represent 51% of peak day demand, while 
commercial and industrial consumers represent 30% and 19%, 
t · I 203 respec lve y. 
Experimental programs appear to confirm the previous 
analysis. A pilot program in Little Rock, Arkansas found that each 
new real-time pricing customer helped to avoid the installation of 
1.5 kW of electricity, saving $1,200 in capital costS.204 The net 
savings was $350 per customer after paying $850 to install the 
necessary metering.205 Similarly, program participants in a 
voluntary New York program, which reduced peak load by an 
201. Reliable data on customer load factors are difficult to get, but there 
seems to be a consensus among industry analysts that large industrial 
consumers have load factors (calculated by dividing average demand by peak 
demand) in the range of 80%, commercial consumers have load factors in the 
vicinity of 60%, and residential consumers have load factors of 40% or less. See 
Robert McCullough & Ruben Brown, Electric Industry Restructuring: The Effect 
on Rates Nationwide, FORTNIGHTLY, July 15, 1994, at 20, 21 (conducting an 
analysis using load factors of 80%, 60%, and 40%, respectively, for industrial, 
commercial, and residential consumers). 
202. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 4. In addition to residential, 
commercial, and industrial demand, "other" demand (primarily street lighting 
and other sales to government entities) represents about 3% of annual demand. 
Id. at 4,78. 
203. See McCullough & Brown, supra note 201, at 21. Since load factor 
equals annual demand divided by peak demand, peak demand is calculated by 
dividing annual demand by the load factor (expressed as a decimal). This 
analysis simplifies a complex issue, since not every peak load occurs 
simultaneously (that is, residential users may use the most power on a hot day, 
while a factory may peak as a function of its production scheduling). Therefore, 
since peaks are non-coincidental, system peak demand will be less than the sum 
of each user's peak demand. The simple analysis demonstrates that residential 
consumers account for a higher percentage of peak demand than they do of 
average demand. 
204. Albert L. Danielsen & Nainish K. Gupta, Seven Myths of Real-Time 
Pricing, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 11997, at 23, 23. 
205. Id. 
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amount equivalent to the generating capacity of a large gas turbine 
power plant, received $3.3 million in rebates, which is less than 1% 
of how much such a plant would cost. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The valuable effort to restructure and reform electricity 
markets is not addressed to reducing the pollution and other 
environmental problems caused by relying on fossil fuels, 
particularly coal, to generate electricity. This failure has generated 
interest in a new Smart Model of electricity regulation that would 
increase reliance on renewable energy sources and would make the 
electrical grid more efficient and more reliable. 
We believe the Smart Model should also address the demand for 
electricity by basing the price of electricity on the marginal cost of 
producing it. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the adoption 
of smart generation and delivery methods is going slowly, primarily 
because these alternatives are more costly than traditional forms of 
generation and delivery. Second, one of the reasons for the limited 
demand is that consumers are not currently paying for the actual 
cost of the electricity that they purchase, particularly during periods 
of peak demand. 
Marginal cost pricing will lead to greater conservation of energy 
and thereby reduce some of the adverse environmental impacts 
associated with the production of electricity. Moreover, it will also 
reduce the amount of money that the country will have to invest in 
additional generation and transmission capacity. While we are 
uncertain of the magnitude of these positive effects, we are confident 
that consumption side reform should be pursued on the basis of the 
information we have and present in this paper. 
We would not ignore the opportunity to pursue smart 
generation alternatives. The government has a role to play here. It 
can do so by fostering technological development and promoting 
smart generation methods and a Smart Grid. Governmental efforts 
are justified because they address the environmental hazards 
associated with traditional electricity generation. Nevertheless, the 
widespread adoption of smart generation options will require them 
to attract private investment. Until this happens, the government 
should require the installation of electricity meters that permit the 
use of marginal cost pricing, a reform whose time has come. 
There has been some movement in the direction of adopting 
marginal cost pricing. It is used in some markets for large 
industrial customers,206 and it has been offered to some residential 
206. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text 
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consumers in experimental programs.207 At the same time, even the 
biggest supporters of marginal cost pricing recognize that there is 
little political will in most regulatory jurisdictions to expose 
consumers to price spikes and market volatility.208 This dynamic 
might change, however, if environmental advocates recognize the 
advantages of adopting marginal cost pricing for protecting the 
environment. Environmental organizations and citizens might 
provide the missing political constituency. In light of the 
opportunity to reduce demand, particularly peak demand, for 
electricity, they should take on this cause. 
Furthermore, it should be possible to design rate programs that 
shield vulnerable consumers from assuming the entire economic 
risks of price fluctuations.209 While such approaches could reduce 
the impact of marginal cost pricing in terms of reducing demand, 
they would still be desirable as compared to current reliance on 
average cost pricing. 
207. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text 
208. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12. 
209. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text 
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